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This thesis addresses questions relating to perceptions of abilities and abnormalities found 
in everyday life. Abilities in this paper range from a total lack of ability to function in 
extreme disability to a level of ability expected by society to enhanced and radically 
enhanced abilities and their place in the realm of abnormality. We begin by establishing the 
differences between abilities and enhancements. Following this is a discussion regarding 
the ethical concerns of human enhancement. After this we turn to a discussion of 
abnormality and the social experience of abnormality. These discussions lead into 
establishing a basis for how many abilities are considered abnormal. This is then followed 
by a discussion that specifically addresses whether or not individuals who voluntarily 



























Ability and Abnormality 
 
Differences in ability have led to a hierarchical perspective of how people function 
in the world. Historically speaking, we discuss the plight of people with disabilities as being 
discriminated against because they are disabled. Their discrimination and oppression is 
based on the abnormal quality of their ability. Proponents of enhancement argue that 
enhancements can help the lives of people with disabilities. I suggest that enhancement and 
disability discussions overlook an important aspect, the status of being abnormal. While 
disability advocates recognise that their discrimination and oppression is a result of their 
abnormal ability, we do not recognise the abnormality of enhancement. Instead, we ask 
whether or not to enhance, if enhancement is ethically right or wrong. We do not ask how 
the lives of enhanced individuals may be seen. Assuming that enhancements are an 
inevitable step in biotechnology, I am going to explore the aspects of abnormality as related 
to those with disabilities and those with enhanced abilities. Radical human enhancement is 
a specific type of enhancement that goes beyond enhancement that merely improves a 
specific ability such as increasing eyesight to see beyond the ordinarily visible spectrum, 
increase hearing capabilities, and potentially increase other functions such as physical 
speed and strength. Radical human enhancement is a practice endorsed by transhumanist 
philosophy. The practices include seeking ways to halt aging altogether and thus increase 
lifespan indefinitely, uploading of consciousness where the conscious mind is removed 
from the human body and uploaded to a machine, and enhancing memory and cognitive 
abilities. Proponents of such enhancement seek to push humanity into what some might 
say is the next step in evolution. The idea of human enhancement of any level carries with it 
many ethical issues.  Nick Bostrom lists levels of objection to transhumanist objectives, of 
which I will focus on one, which is that “it would be too bad for society,” (2013, 30). Within 
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this level of objection is a question concerning ability. That, is, are some abilities better 
than others? Should we seek to “improve” or “enhance” abilities? What happens to the 
people who choose not to do so? Radical human enhancement advocates seek to greatly 
expand human ability into something beyond human. When we explore this extension, we 
have a whole new set of questions to ask. Who are these people? Are they human? Do they 
count as persons? Individuals with enhanced abilities, radical or otherwise, have abilities 
that fall outside average human ability. A normal ability is what we expect ourselves to be 
able to do without great difficulty. Most conversations regarding the abnormality of ability 
fall into realm of the abnormality of disability. I seek to expand the definition of abnormal 
ability to include those abilities that have been enhanced. Further, I shall demonstrate that 
enhanced individuals have the potential to experience marginalisation and discrimination 
as well, based on their abnormal status. 
This project aims to demonstrate how regardless of disability or enhanced ability, 
perceived abnormality of ability is subject to discrimination and normalisation to maintain 
a social standard or status quo. The existing literature in the ethics of enhancement 
concerns a broad view of society, by evaluating enhancement as either a utopian vision 
where enhancements solve the problems of humanity or as a dystopian existential 
destruction of humanity. The focus of much existing literature consists of arguments of why 
we should or should not pursue enhancement technologies rather than how we might 
implement them or what they might look like when they come to fruition. Enhancement 
technologies have been in development and use for some time now, to varying degrees of 
enhancement and acceptability. The interest here, then, is about the perception of 
enhanced individuals through the lens of abnormality. Arguably, one might say that 
enhancement is a normal step or development stemming from human progress. From that 
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perspective, denying enhancement would be unethical. On the other hand, one might argue 
that pursuing enhancements is abnormal. While I will argue that enhanced individuals are 
currently abnormal, and radical enhancement is a particular case of abnormality, 
enhancement in itself may not be entirely abnormal, especially on the individual level. 
Abnormal individuals already exist in society. Further, a wide variety of these abnormal 
individuals experience discrimination and oppression. Granted, not all abnormal 
individuals face such hardships. Particular factors, notably visibility, play a significant role 
in determining how likely one might be accepted as normal. It would be the case then, if 
enhancement causes a person to be abnormal in the right way, that enhanced individuals 
may face a similar experience.  
In order to do this, first we will look at accounts of abilities ranging from disabilities 
to enhanced abilities. Our current understandings of abilities rest on a linear conception in 
which one either has or does not have an ability, with levels of expertise or capability 
within that ability. Next, I have categorically divided enhancements by their ethical 
acceptance. Following the discussion of ability, I will highlight several overarching themes 
in the current literature of the ethics of enhancements debates. The themes are centred 
around autonomy, equality and accessibility, and oppressive tactics such as eugenics. We 
leave enhancement and ability behind, briefly, to explore the concept of abnormality. 
Michel Foucault provides a sufficient genealogical account of how abnormality began, from 
a dangerous concept of the absolutely heinous criminal monster to the everyday monsters 
and little abnormalities found all around us. Foucault’s history provides background to 
describe the normalisation process. The normalisation process is one arm of a discussion 
on discrimination and oppression. Another arm is the idea of visibility. Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson’s work on staring is enlightening here, as staring plays the initial action that 
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determines the initial normal/abnormal judgment. All of this folds into a further discussion 
of how enhanced individuals could face similar issues that other abnormal persons already 
face in our society. While I limit most of the discussion to this point to somewhat minor and 
more acceptable enhancement, I conclude with a chapter regarding transhumanism as a 
special case of enhancement. While we may disagree with transhumanism advocates, there 
is a certain level of longer term inevitability with enhancement. Transhumanism is 
considered a fringe or bizarre practice, but it is a radicalised philosophy related to 
enhancement technology that has significant overlaps that may illuminate a rather 
interesting point, especially regarding disability. But first, an outline of ability. 
Chapter 1: Ability, Disability, and Enhancement 
This chapter addresses relationships between disabilities and enhancements. I have 
divided this chapter into four subsections: disability, what is meant by enhancement, types 
of enhancements, and the demarcation of what is considered therapeutic and what is 
considered an enhancement. I use the term everyday enhancement specifically to 
emphasize how we readily accept certain types of enhancements as normal parts of our 
everyday lives. Types of enhancements do not necessarily exist in a moral hierarchy. 
However, we act as if some enhancements are more morally acceptable than others. In 
order to understand how this hierarchy developed, we must first address the difference 
between therapeutic measures and enhancements. This chapter serves to provide 
necessary background and definitions for later in the paper, where I will address specific 
ethical arguments related to the task at hand. 
Ability and Disability 
When we discuss someone’s ability, we often refer to a task-specific ability, such as 
the ability to walk or the ability to hear. The ability to perform an action is the 
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undercurrent of a human behaviour. An ability, used over time, forms a pattern which we 
called behaviour. Behaviours adapt and change. An ability is essentially our capacity to act. 
These actions may be in thinking or in movement, invisible or visible. When we speak of an 
individual’s ability to perform a task, we refer not only to their individual capacity to 
perform that task, but also to the tools that are available. These tools are in the body, the 
mind, and the environment. For this paper, we will be focusing on physical and mental 
abilities such as thinking and walking. 
 Discussions of ability naturally bring about the idea of disability. Or, what it means 
to have an ability that differs from what one might ordinarily expect. I’ll discuss the aspects 
of normality in the next section, but we must clarify what is meant by disability. Two major 
models of disability exist. One is the medical model. The other is the social model. The 
medical model of disability suggests disability as a lack of ability to perform a certain task 
such as walking. Medical models of disability emphasize disability as an impairment of 
functioning. The Americans with Disabilities Act first defines disability as the following: 
The term "disability" means… (A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record 
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
The medical model describes disability as a series of impairments or inabilities to 
function at a certain non-disabled level. This model of disability focuses on an individual 
not being able to do a particular task by either having the complete inability to perform 
such a task, like walking or speaking, or having difficulty in performing that task.  
 On the other hand, the social model of disability refers to disability as a failure of 
society to receive a person of abnormal ability to function with at least some autonomy and 
efficiency in the world. That is, a person who cannot hear is only disabled in so far as her 
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ability to communicate is not verbal - it is visual. A person who cannot see is disabled in an 
environment that emphasizes the primacy of sight. Social models of disability emphasize 
disability as a condition of the world, where physical structures and architecture are 
designed for able-bodied people. Think of the addition of ramps and elevators, Braille and 
closed captioning. People who advocate for disability rights focus on the social and 
environmental design as the core feature of disability. If all books were made using only 
Braille, a seeing person would have to read much differently. The person with sight would 
be disabled in such a world until they adapted to that environment. The social mode 
critiques the medical model in that where the medical model focuses on a deficit on 
individual ability, the social model identifies a deficit in the developed physical and social 
environment. Fortunately for social theorists of disability, the World Health Organisation 
has recognised this critique to an extent in a comment describing disability in the following 
statement: 
Disabilities is an umbrella term, covering impairments, activity limitations, 
and participation restrictions. An impairment is a problem in body function or 
structure; an activity limitation is a difficulty encountered by an individual in 
executing a task or action; while a participation restriction is a problem experienced 
by an individual in involvement in life situations. Disability is thus not just a health 
problem. It is a complex phenomenon, reflecting the interaction between features of 
a person’s body and features of the society in which he or she lives. Overcoming the 
difficulties faced by people with disabilities requires interventions to remove 
environmental and social barriers. People with disabilities have the same health 
needs as non-disabled people – for immunization, cancer screening etc. They also 
may experience a narrower margin of health, both because of poverty and social 
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exclusion, and also because they may be vulnerable to secondary conditions, such as 
pressure sores or urinary tract infections. Evidence suggests that people with 
disabilities face barriers in accessing the health and rehabilitation services they 
need in many settings. 
The WHO definition of disability touches a bit on the social aspect of disability by claiming 
that disability “reflects the interaction between a person’s body and society.” However, 
disability is defined, a few things are clear. Our environment does not suit each body that 
exists in it, regardless of what tools we develop and use to make our environment more 
accessible for the individual. Under the medical model of disability, we are expected to 
adapt our bodies to our environments. Disability advocates claim that the demand to adapt 
should be at least partially shouldered by society. Our abilities, wherever in the spectrum of 
inability to an enhanced ability they may lie, determine how we change our environment to 
meet our needs. Disability is not wholly determined by society or pathology. Rather, it is a 
function of both, the individual and the environment, social and physical. 
What is Enhancement? 
 First of all, we must address what is meant by enhancement. The definition is rather 
elusive, but all the descriptions of enhancement that I have found have a theme. These 
definitions frequently refer to increasing or improving an ability. Enhancement changes an 
ability insofar as the ability is still the same ability, just faster, stronger, more efficient, 
and/or long-lasting. As an example, Julian Savulescu defends what he calls the Welfarist 
Definition of Enhancement, defined as “any change in the biology or psychology of a person 
which increases the chances of leading a good life in circumstances C… we can define an 
enhanced state as a capability" (2006, 324). Savulescu also notes other definitions of 
enhancement, such as a narrow definition, in which enhancement is “any change in the 
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biology or psychology of a person which increases species typical normal functioning above 
some statistically defined level" (2006, 325). As another example, Michael Sandel describes 
enhancement as a means “to lift themselves above the norm" (2007, 8). Sandel does not 
describe exactly to what is meant by “norm” but safe to say the norm likely resembles some 
level of being of typical or normal ability within a specific context. Yet another definition of 
enhancement, referring specifically to human enhancement, is from Natasha Vita-More, 
claiming “human enhancement means improving physical performance, increasing 
cognitive abilities, and radically extending human lifespan" (2013, 25). Enhancements, in 
essence, extend an already present ability. In some cases, however, an enhancement may 
involve the addition of an entirely new ability. 
Types of Enhancement 
For the sake of this paper, I will discuss three broad categories of enhancement: 
everyday enhancements, therapeutic enhancements, and radical enhancements. These are 
based somewhat in relation to their overall acceptance in mainstream culture. All 
enhancements overlap in some way, and the differences are largely dependent on the 
intended outcome of the enhancement and the context in which it is used. Enhancements 
come in a wide variety of forms. Some enhancements may be temporary, permanent, or 
detachable. Some are mechanical additions to the body. Others come in the shape of a pill 
or a syrup to ingest. Still others may be creams or lotions. Even further, some come in the 
form of wheelchairs or crutches - physical tools that we use for a specific mode of 
transporting ourselves. Some enhancements are visual, while others are internal. Still 
others may never be known to other people unless explicitly disclosed. The form of the 
enhancement may vary from organic to mechanical, or even be a combination. Each form of 
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enhancement can be found in any of the following categories. The categories I propose are 
my own, developed to highlight a social hierarchy of acceptability. 
When referring to “everyday” enhancements, I mean the little enhancements that 
are most common and generally socially accepted. These enhancements are to “improve” 
the ordinary ability baseline. An important feature of these everyday enhancements is that 
they are not necessarily dramatic or extraordinary in some way. Another important quality 
is that they are unnecessary to function in the world. That is, they do not serve to correct a 
deficit. These enhancements are not unlike things with which we are already familiar - 
drinking coffee, consuming supplements like ginkgo biloba or 5-HTP to improve nominally 
functional cognition and mood, taking other nootropics such as modafinil or 
dextroamphetamine to increase alertness and cognitive capacity. These consist of the 
already established means of enhancement that we do not necessarily think of as an 
enhancement (drinking coffee). I call them everyday enhancements because oftentimes, 
they are things that are so ordinary in our everyday lives that we do not consider them as 
uniquely enhancing. Everyday enhancements are generally socially accepted, aligning with 
cultural norms. Oftentimes, they can be the same measures or technologies as therapeutic 
enhancements.  
Therapeutic enhancement are enhancements designed to correct a disability by 
restoring a specific loss or deficit of ability. This type of enhancement addresses deficit in 
ability with the goal of amelioration. Examples of therapeutic enhancements are prosthetic 
legs, wheelchairs for paralysed individuals, medications for any number of cognitive 
impairments, and so forth. Any technology that serves to replace or correct an ability that 
has been lost or never developed serves as a therapeutic enhancement. Overlaps exist 
between therapeutic and everyday enhancement by their technological mechanisms. The 
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difference is the baseline ability being changed. For example, we might wear glasses to 
improve already normal vision. Another person may wear glasses to correct poor sight. The 
therapeutic value of an enhancement is in the context of its application. Therapeutic 
enhancement is generally referred to simply as a therapy, or a treatment that has 
therapeutic value. These are generally accepted by society and encouraged so that a 
disabled individual can regain independence. Together, therapeutic and everyday 
enhancements differ from another set of enhancements in that they are generally more 
readily available and frequently seen out in the world.  
The third type of enhancement I wish to address are radical enhancements. These 
are extreme measures taken to change human ability. Radical enhancement takes on a 
different level of alteration from our everyday enhancements. But when we start 
compounding enhancements, we reach things that no unenhanced person, regardless of 
how gifted or extraordinary in ability, human can do. Radical enhancement takes this step. 
Examples include, but certainly are not limited to the ability to breathe underwater without 
external equipment, altering genetics with gene therapy, uploading the human mind to a 
machine, using nanobots to maintain health, indefinite healthy life extension that 
resembles immortality, and achieving superintelligence in a human being. These changes 
are likely to be permanent or irreversible as they incorporate significant alterations to the 
human body or reject the body altogether. A major question posed by those who study 
radical enhancement is whether or not the radically enhanced individual is still human or 
something else? Does personhood remain intact? The potential of radical enhancement is 
that it may change the individual from being human to being posthuman, or transhuman. 
Radical enhancements delve into areas of science fiction and wild imagination, but 
scientists are already working on some of these and more. 
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Enhancement or Therapy? 
A demarcation problem exists in enhancement discussion, between everyday 
enhancements and therapeutic enhancements, as briefly mentioned above. Andy Miah 
claims that, “one may attempt to draw the line between the alleviation of suffering 
(therapy) and the pursuit of happiness (happiness)" (2013, 292). “Alleviation of suffering” 
is typically how we would refer to therapeutic enhancements with their goal of 
ameliorating disability, disease, or disorder. For example, an individual who wears glasses 
because they have less than perfect eyesight ought to wear the sight-enhancing glasses or 
receive the sight-enhancing surgery. However, a person who has normal vision may also 
wear glasses or have surgery to see even better than they already can. This first case is 
therapeutic, while the second is to increase happiness. Medications also enjoy this dual 
usage. In particular, modafinil has gained popularity for its therapeutic qualities as 
awakeness agent in narcoleptics as well as its benefits for enhancing the abilities of pilots 
and soldiers. The subject ability here is the ability to stay awake. When we make a drug or a 
new treatment, it often used for more than one purpose. The drug use may be purely an 
enhancement to raise performance from baseline, such as a soldier who would benefit from 
the additional wakefulness. But if someone performs significantly below an average 
baseline, such as someone with chronic fatigue syndrome, this is a therapeutic 
enhancement as it is corrective. The individual mode of normality is not necessarily the 
same normal for a population. The demarcation problem between what is therapeutic and 
what is enhancement is largely dependent on the intent of the individual using the 
technology.  
We see this illustrated with another medical practice as well. Botox was marketed as 
a cosmetic enhancement before it was known to treat muscle spasms and migraines. As a 
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cosmetic enhancement, the medication mostly fell under the category of morphological 
freedom. It bridges over to enhancement as well, if done correctly, in that it enhances one’s 
appearance. When the medication is used in such a way to enhance appearance, one also 
enhances one’s social status. When used for muscle spasm and migraine, one is using it as a 
therapeutic enhancement. It is a treatment to resolve a debilitating medical problem. 
Muscle spasm and migraines can be disabling conditions. The enhancement therapy ended 
up being useful for more than enhancement. Botox is now also a therapeutic enhancement, 
enhancing the lives of those individuals who are disabled by migraines. Many medical 
interventions serve multiple modalities of enhancement. 
Another issue in enhancement practices is the role of preventative medicine. 
Medical technologies related to prevention such as vaccination pose an interesting 
question. While we are manipulating our immune systems to have an ability that we would 
not ordinarily have by injecting ourselves with a dead virus, are we necessarily engaging in 
the practice of enhancement? Miah states, 
... medical science has approached healthcare by giving primacy to the principle of 
prevention before cure. Yet a similar principle may require to be employed in order 
to optimise and expand the resilience and capabilities of people; in short, to enhance 
them. On this basis, the distinction between therapy and enhancement becomes 
redundant, since preventing many illnesses will involve treating a patient before 
they are diagnosed with an illness and before they are considered to be suffering in 
a way that warrants medical intervention. (2013, 293) 
In a way, we have blurred the lines between what is preventative care and what is 
enhancement. Genetic manipulation that prevents certain fatal or severely disabling 
illnesses is technically an enhancement and a preventative treatment. Some medical 
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technologies are being developed to bolster the immune system in other ways in order 
to prevent disease. Is this an enhancement or a prevention? Altering the immune system 
to prevent infections is an enhancement in that we are changing the human body to do 
more than it ordinarily would do. Immune-enhancing practices are also preventative in 
that they are performed as a way to treat before something happens. As an example, 
Wendell Wallach claims that vaccines are both preventative measures and 
enhancements. He states that “if vaccines were once an enhancement, they are now a 
birthright” (Wallach, 2014, 167). The possibility that preventative medicine is 
enhancement in disguise is not entirely incorrect. What would need addressing is 
whether or not we should be preventing illness, by way of enhancing ourselves.  
Chapter 2: Ethics of Enhancement Overview 
This section will address the themes in ethics of enhancement debates. The 
themes are wide reaching and tend to focus on the priority of individual autonomy, 
concerns of equality, and the potential for eugenic practices that are viewed as 
discriminatory towards people with disabilities. The argument from individual 
autonomy includes a sub-argument addressing morphological freedom. It is important 
to note that like most debates in bioethics, these discussions tend to be one-sided from a 
Western perspective with little allusion to attitudes in other parts of the world. While 
the purpose of this thesis is not to debate whether or not we should go forward with 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic enhancements, it is nonetheless prudent to outline a 
few arguments to provide context. 
 Robert Glover and Michael Sandel both discuss the use of genetic engineering to 
facilitate the ability to choose of deafness. Deafness is often described in terms of a 
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medical disability, as a lack of ability to hear. Deaf culture requires deaf people to 
continue. Only by having deaf children is this possible. Should parents be able to 
determine in advance whether or not their children can hear? Some view the use of 
genetic modification to determine a certain trait as enhancement. However, when 
choosing to have a deaf child on purpose through this technology, it looks as if we are 
engineering disability given that we are viewing deafness as a disability. In deaf-centric 
environments, deafness is not necessarily considered a disability because deafness is the 
status quo of that particular environment. Being able to hear in such an environment 
may not be a total disability if the hearing individual learns sign language. However, the 
hearing individual would be unusual or even abnormal in such a context. This initiates 
another discussion of how the social environment ought to respond to the individual 
who is considered disabled. This complex question addresses major components of 
human enhancement: autonomy, morphological freedom, and social theory of disability 
and normalisation. The specific case of bioengineering a deaf child highlights how the 
use of biomedical technologies must be viewed in context. 
 A major theme in enhancement debates is individual autonomy. One claim is that 
parents who genetically modify their children’s genes before birth somehow determine 
their child’s future by depriving them of the right to choose for themselves the type of 
person they will become. A common term thrown around in enhancement debates is 
“designer babies.” These are children that have been “designed” by parents and doctors 
who select specific genetic traits. Robert Nozick described this process as a “genetic 
supermarket” wherein individuals could essentially “order” children that meet their 
specific preferences for genetic traits. Sandel argues against this, claiming that, “it 
wrongly implies that, absent a designing parent, children are free to choose their 
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physical characteristics for themselves…” (2007, 7-8). Children do not get a choice as to 
the fact that they are born, with what bodies, capabilities, and genes they might have. 
Sandel’s refutation is a pragmatic response to the argument from autonomy. All 
children, regardless of how they are formed by nature or genetic manipulation, are 
subject to being born. They are brought into the world without consent. Nozick’s genetic 
supermarket is a more conscious way of controlling the traits of the children being born. 
We think that we consciously make the decision to have children with certain people, 
but there are many biological forces beyond our control that influence our decisions. 
The genetic supermarket extends our conscious efforts to choose reproductive partners 
we desire in order to have healthy viable children. The existence of autonomy of the 
unborn child is debatable at best. However, parents and doctors, with their established 
autonomy, have some authority over the bodies of unborn children and even born 
children, but only up to a point. The point where parental authority over their children 
ends varies from one practice to another. At some point, parents must forfeit their 
authority over their children so their children can express their own agency in the 
world. The autonomy of children develops over time regardless of genetic manipulation 
unless autonomy is somehow engineered out of the person. That would beg the 
question, though, of whether or not a non-autonomous person is a person. In the case of 
bioengineering deaf children, the idea is that somehow deafness determines the type of 
individual the child will be and limits their future autonomy. By forcing deafness on the 
child, the parents have deprived the child from the ability to hear. While this is the case 
with the ability, the child could have been born deaf with or without the genetic 
intervention. Further, if the child wants to be able to hear, later in life he may choose to 
undergo a procedure for a Cochlear implant or, if possible, reverse the process that 
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caused the deafness in the first place. While bioengineering shapes some aspects of a 
child’s life, it does not necessarily take away their autonomy. 
 In addition to addressing individual autonomy, Sandel also discusses “designer 
children” in the context of how the practice of genetic manipulation goes against certain 
aspects of what it means to be human by stating, 
... the fate of human goods embodied in important social practices - norms of 
unconditional love and an openness to the unbidden, in the case of parenting; the 
celebration of natural talents and gifts in athletic and artistic endeavours; 
humility in the face of privilege, and a willingness to share the fruits of good 
fortune through institutions of social solidarity. The other involves our 
orientation to the world that we inhabit, and the kind of freedom to which we 
aspire. (Sandel, 2007, 96) 
Sandel’s arguments, he claims, are of a different type than the common themes of 
autonomy and rights. Instead, he focuses on the idea that enhancement somehow 
undermines what it means to be human. On the one hand, Sandel’s idea of being human 
includes celebrating what we have and who we are, as social creatures. On the other hand, 
enhancement changes how we view ourselves in the world - that we must adapt to the 
world, rather than making the world adapt to us. He goes on to say that, 
…changing our nature to fit the world, rather than the other way around, is actually 
the deepest form of disempowerment. It distracts us from reflecting critically on the 
world, and deadens the impulse to social and political improvement. Rather than 
employ our new genetic powers, we should do what we can to create social and 
political arrangements more hospitable to the gifts and limitations of imperfect 
human beings. (Sandel, 2007, 97) 
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Sandel’s rejection of enhancement measures are based in embracing human nature rather 
than trying to change it. While to an extent, I agree that by focusing on improvement and 
enhancement, we may lose sight of other social goals, Sandel’s argument can stand a 
critique. Enhancement is not necessarily about perfecting an imperfect individual. 
Enhancement, from a broader perspective, is about increasing the pool of tools and abilities 
so that all may benefit, regardless of their limitations. The practice is inherently imperfect 
with imperfect results. Perfection itself is a subjective notion. 
As a response to Sandel’s claim that enhancement detracts from humanity by taking 
a perfectionist approach, we might look at enhancement another way. We can view 
enhancement as a response to taking that critical reflection on the world. Proponents for 
enhancement often argue that enhancement is not only for the sake of the individual, but 
for the sake of society. Those who believe enhancements will assist in human flourishing in 
the utopian view certainly take up this claim. From another point of view, Andy Miah states, 
“anti-enhancement advocates may argue that such an undertaking is troubling precisely 
because it implies no labour on the part of the individual - and as such is a quick fix that 
undermines the importance of human will and struggle in the achievement of certain goals" 
(2013, 296). Miah takes this approach to mean that not only do we use what we have when 
we are born, but all of the technologies we develop as we grow and learn may also be 
utilised within reasonable limits. Developing and using technology does not imply in any 
way that we are forgoing reflecting on our place in the world. 
Unfortunately, what it means to be human has no real tangible answer, especially 
when we are discussing which of our abilities are ethically acceptable and which are not. I 
would argue that enhancement is a powerful tool not only for the individual, but also, if 
exercised with caution and deep consideration, a benefit for society in general. It simply is 
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not the case that we focus on political and social betterment by not focusing on 
enhancement. Society and politics will always change, for better and for worse, and with or 
without enhancement. Enhancement can impact social and political change, of course, as 
enhancement affects any social organisation. Enhancement should not be viewed as a trade 
off with reflection and betterment. Enhancement essentially extends abilities without 
necessarily rejecting the abilities already present, within a person or within a society. An 
enhancement builds upon abilities already present and extends the range of that ability. 
Just because people want to develop enhancement technologies does not mean they are 
seeking to undermine whatever sense it is to being human. The idea that enhancement 
technologies ignore some human authenticity cannot be sustained if we have no clear idea 
of what it is to be human. Part of human behaviour has always been development so that 
we may have better means of surviving. As a result, humans have an incredible lineage of 
technological development. Applying that technology to our bodies and our environments 
is a part of our means to continue going on as humans. While human nature may not be 
something that can be described in some essential qualitative terms, we may be right to 
take on the intuition that we use whatever means we can to survive and thrive as a species. 
Enhancements of all kinds are a part of human life.  While we may not be able to say exactly 
what it means to be human or what is in human nature, we do ascribe a moral status to 
being human. To take away that moral status is to dehumanize a person.  
Returning to the main aspects of the ethics of enhancement, we find the argument 
for morphological freedom buried within the argument for autonomy. Morphological 
freedom is the right to do as one pleases with one’s own body. This includes a wide variety 
of practices ranging from how a person may cut their hair to getting plastic surgery or 
taking medications to improve performance capacities. Anders Sandberg describes 
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morphological freedom as a negative right. He claims that “it is a right to be able to do 
certain things, but it does not in itself imply others are morally obliged to support exercise 
of it" (2013, 57). Sandberg makes the claim that arguments against enhancement must 
denounce some level of morphological freedom, because it forces a compulsory restriction 
on a broadened spectrum of ability to change one’s body. In a sense, morphological 
freedom is an extension of a libertarian or social contractarian right to one’s body. As a 
negative right, though, it must come with some aspect of a positive right, and that would be 
a right to the tools and technology used to change one’s body as one sees fit. We actually 
see this argument in transgender debates today, where we must contemplate whether or 
not gender reassignment surgeries and hormonal therapies are a right. With positive 
rights, however, comes a certain limitations of resources. Positive rights cannot be enacted 
without appropriate resources. So, as to how far a positive right can actually be executed is 
contingent on whether or not the resources are available and how critical the right is for 
survival.  
Transhumanists and enhancement supporters claim that enhancement technologies 
could benefit those affected by disability by offering more functional tools and techniques 
to improve quality of life. On this point, Miah states that, “... the justification for limiting 
medical interventions to just the alleviation of suffering, becomes less meaningful, since 
healthcare should aspire to promoting general improvements in wellbeing, in which 
enhancements are a part" (2013, 292). The alleviation of suffering can take a wide stance 
or a narrow stance. While a significant range of medicine takes the narrow stance of curing 
illness that has already begun, other areas of medicine take on preventative roles. 
Preventative medicine can initiate a slippery slope argument. Disability theorists argue that 
variants of eugenics will result if enhancements that prevent certain conditions is 
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embraced, continuing to further devalue the lives of people with disabilities. Eugenics is 
defined by Merriam-Webster as “a science that tries to improve the human race by 
controlling which people become parents.” Frederick Osborn describes eugenics in two 
ways, positive and negative where positive eugenics focuses on increasing desirable traits 
in the human population by encouraging people with desirable traits to reproduce and 
negative eugenics is described as the prevention of people with undesirable traits from 
reproducing. A newer variant of eugenics, called modern eugenics, employs the use of 
genetic engineering to achieve similar goals but without denying the right to reproduce. 
Modern eugenics comes from an idea of “positive eugenics” that relate back to the idea of 
being able to choose genetic traits of children to prevent the development of disabling 
conditions and diseases. In this way, genetic engineering can be linked to an idea of 
“positive eugenics” in that no one is being denied the ability to have children and thus is not 
considered to be necessarily discriminatory. Rather, people with genetic conditions would 
be afforded the option to ensure that their children would not inherit such conditions (such 
as Tay-Sachs or cerebral palsy). The idea is that since it is a choice, rather than a law or 
enforcement, it is more allowable. However, modern eugenics still has the same problem 
that disability theorists address: by giving the choice we are inherently allowing the 
discriminatory practice to decide that some traits are bad while others are good.  
Availability and access are frequently cited as a concern for enhancement debates. 
This comes from the idea that certain technologies will be out of reach for those who 
cannot afford them and will increase socioeconomic gaps. People who already experience 
socioeconomically difficulty would face even more marginalisation. In essence, the worry is 
that without appropriate access to such technologies, those who could not afford them 
would be left behind. Julian Savulescu points out that this is a matter of justice, and not 
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necessarily about an intrinsic quality of enhancement. The fairness of enhancement and 
access to it is largely dependent on the type of justice practiced by a particular society. This 
holds true as enhancement itself has no particular status of being just or unjust until it is 
executed in a society. We do not halt the development of technology or stop public and 
private education because the least of us can access it. Why would we do that with 
enhancement? It is possible that there is social benefit for enhancement if it is developed 
with respect to injustices unique to the society in which it is developed and dispersed. The 
prioritisation should not rely on enhancing individuals on the basis that they want it. 
Research and development in enhancement should be done in response to meeting needs 
of particular societies or groups. Unfortunately, this does become part of the larger picture 
of resource allocation and distribution that cannot be answered here except to say that 
those who have so much to be able to invest in such advancement may in fact owe it to 
others to use those technologies for their benefit, not the benefit of the ones who can afford 
it. Much like wealthy Western nations develop technologies to help with food and water 
supplies in world regions that are critically underserved, similar rulings are likely to apply 
here. Stemming from concerns regarding resource allocation is that any technological 
development suffers from the fact that the parts and pieces, the machinery or it all, often 
comes from exploited labour forces. This is a fact that may never change. It does beg the 
question, though, of whether or not we should accept such machinery for other uses. The 
technology that is being developed for enhancement does not need to be outsourced. In 
fact, enhancement proponents can take it upon themselves to change the bar by 
purposefully fabricating resources through more just means. Granted, much of this lies in 
business ethics and political justice which are immensely larger topics than can be 
addressed here. 
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In opposition to enhancement being unethical, some scholars, such as Julian 
Savulescu and John Harris, go as far as making the claim that we may actually be morally 
obligated to enhance ourselves and our children. In April of 2015, the Chinese experienced 
international backlash for genetically modifying human embryos to prevent the incidence 
of thalassemia. Thalassemia is not a fatal condition and can be managed with vigilant 
medical supervision. Gregory Stock describes several cultural differences in the acceptance 
of eugenic practices and genetic manipulations, through how abortion is suggested to 
expecting couples. Quoting a paper by Darryl Macer and colleagues, Stock notes that “up to 
80% of Americans would use genetic interventions to prevent a child from inheriting a fatal 
disease" (2013, 306). This is despite that in the United States we have multiple means to 
support families with disabled individuals. On the other hand, those surveyed in the United 
States do not support the abortion of unborn children with known genetic defects that are 
survivable. Stock claims that, “the option for caring for a seriously disabled child or passing 
that responsibility on to the state is a modern luxury that few possess" (2013, 306). He 
cites a particular genetic anomaly where this is true, in which up to 92% of Chinese 
counsellors would advise the abortion of a foetus with the most common form of dwarfism 
whereas fewer than 10% of those surveyed in the United States, Australia, and most of 
western Europe would consider the option (2013, 307). Another survey performed by Xin 
Mao and Dorothy Wertz found that up to 89% of Chinese couples supported abortion of 
foetuses with genetic abnormalities (1997). Stock also notes that genetic counsellors also 
advise abortion in cases such as these in countries outside of China that include India, 
Russia, Greece, Cuba, Turkey, and Hungary, more frequently than northern Europe and the 
United States, at rates approaching 90% and 20% respectively. This suggests a cultural 
divergence over which types of children are allowed to exist in the world. Available 
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resources and social support structure greatly impacts these decisions. Engaging in 
enhancement technologies of this sort stands to reinforce an idea that normal bodies are 
desired bodies and abnormal bodies are to be rejected or altered to align with what is 
considered normal. A child who is abnormal in a place such as the United States is allowed 
to be born. The child is still abnormal or disabled, though. In other countries, that child is 
not born at all. Disability resources in those countries are often incredibly scarce if they are 
even resources available at all. Parents will often rather not have to face their only child 
being born and having what could amount to a tortuous life due to an extreme lack of 
support and resources. Views regarding disabilities in countries other than the United 
States vary dramatically and are often handled with far less finesse. The moral norms are 
different. Why bring a child into the world that is going to drain significant resources when 
not enough is available to begin with? What is considered a “life worth living” or a “life 
worth supporting” varies dramatically from culture to culture, often as a result of a number 
of combined factors including resource availability and cultural beliefs about disability. 
This invokes a sense of positive eugenics in that couples should only have “normal” 
children. Normal in this case implies that the child will not create such a strain on their 
surrounding social-familial unit that could potentially threaten the lives and wellbeing of 
their families. In resource-lacking areas, difficult choices must be made where incredible 
sacrifices that could mean life and death would be taken if severely disabled children are 
born. Though they are not being explicitly prohibited from having children, the rule is 
understood without being written.   
If we return to the of potential of having a moral responsibility to enhance, it is 
possible that cultures with restrictive reproductive laws like China’s One Child Policy, 
might embrace enhancement technologies in less resource depleted areas. Gregory Stock 
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suggests that couples “are bound to feel strongly to have the “best” child they can" (2013, 
306). His comment is contextualised in gender politics, where boys are valued more highly 
than girls. In this sense, genetic manipulation in order to have a boy is an enhancement for 
the family. Enhancement of unborn children does not necessarily stop at choosing genders. 
The effects may not be limited to normalising, though, if parents in certain countries 
actually do want to have “the best children possible.” Parents may seek out ways to 
enhance other aspects of their children in order to gain a competitive edge. The abilities 
they choose to enhance may be desirable and valued, but enhancing them to significant 
degrees is abnormal. This suggests another branch of positive eugenics, where eugenics 
operates under the guise that you can have children, even if they are disabled, but they 
must be altered in order to be considered normal and not disabled. Eugenics is an 
expression of social hygiene in order control the sorts of bodies allowed in society in 
various ways. While the enhancement technologies are not aimed at preventing certain 
people from having children, they are aimed at creating more acceptable children. It could 
be said that preventative enhancement technologies are a cousin to eugenics in this way. 
The number of arguments about whether or not we should allow human 
enhancement to any level is enormous. My concern is with a social aspect of enhancement, 
and that is the perception of abnormality. My discussion of abnormality seems a bit 
adjacent to the thematic ethical arguments of enhancement. However, the social status of 
abnormality directly relates to the ethical arguments of how we might go about utilising 
enhancement technologies. 
Chapter 3: Averages, Norms, and the Medicalisation of Abnormality 
The discussion of abnormality and normalisation is complex. This chapter will begin 
with how abnormality differs from the idea of the statistical average, or “normal person”, 
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from Mary Beth Mader. She explains how the numerical average person is fiction. To 
describe someone as normal or abnormal is to make a comparative claim. Her works ties in 
Michel Foucault’s theory of abnormality. In his lectures on abnormality, Foucault describes 
how society developed a medicalised everyday abnormal person. Furthermore, he explains 
how this abnormal individual is subjected to correction or normalisation. The theme of this 
chapter is the relationship of the abnormal to the norm, and the normalisation process. 
In the context of ability, abnormality does not concern only deficit or impairment. 
Rather, abnormality refers to any quality that deviates from a perceived expectation from 
previous experience. Abnormality is a shaped perception that is formed by experience of 
differences over time. We are unaware of abnormality until we have an expectation of what 
is normal or we are explicitly told that something is not normal. For example, as a child, I 
did not know that my family was abnormal. I learned that it was abnormal when someone 
outside of my family told me. This new knowledge was reinforced by pointing out the 
normality of having two parents at home instead of one. Until then, I assumed that my 
family was normal because it was my normal. Learning that my family was abnormal is a 
comparative action when I compare my family to other families. What I knew to be normal 
to me was what I had come to expect. I began with the expectation that other families have 
one parent. When experiencing other families with two parents for the first time, I believed 
that family to be abnormal. As I began to meet more families that have also have two 
parents, I came to realise that my family is the comparatively abnormal family because 
mine did not fall in line with the norm of having two parents. The idea of normal develops 
over time from the individual perspective. 
What is normal is often confused with what is average. To better understand what is 
meant by normal and the associated power of normalisation, we must consider Mary Beth 
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Mader’s analysis of social measure, as it “... helps to distinguish the norm from a law and 
from a rule, custom, or tradition" (2007, 1). Here, Mader explains that the norm, or what is 
considered normal, is not like a law or a rule. People intentionally develop laws and rules. 
Rather, what is perceived as the norm is coincidental. The norm is derived from our own 
qualities, as they happen to exist. Further, the norm, as it is perceived, is a comparison. It is 
how we differentiate what is normal and what is abnormal. Mader states, “Foucault’s 
insight is that it is intrinsic to this new notion of ‘law,’ that is, to the norm, that combine 
prescription and description…” (2007, 8). She is claiming that the norm functions by telling 
us what is and what should be at the same time, using the same measure. How we 
understand the norm in a descriptive capacity is through experience and observation. How 
we understand the norm in a prescriptive capacity is through the process of normalisation.  
Anyone who deviates too far from an expected norm falls into the category of 
abnormal. For example, when speaking of abnormality, we often refer to disability or 
disorder. A mental disability is any cognitive deviance that negatively interferes with 
cognitive function. In the context of disability, this is the medical model of disability. The 
medical model of disability uses the definition of disability provided by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). The ADA states that a disabled person is, “a person who has a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a 
person who has a history or record of such an impairment, or a person who is perceived by 
others as having such an impairment" (1990, 8). A mental disorder, as defined by the 
American Psychological Association and National Institute of Health is defined by a certain 
set of behaviours that cause difficulty and impairment in everyday life. These behaviours 
may be normal behaviours, but the context of the behaviours is abnormal. For instance, a 
classic symptom of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is excessive hand washing. 
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Washing one’s hands is normal, but repetitive and obsessive hand washing is not. This 
particular case describes the subject of the abnormality not the action itself but the 
frequency, duration, magnitude, or intensity of the action.  
When we say “this person is normal”, we mean that this person functions within 
accepted limits. These accepted limits fall within a certain number of deviations on a 
normal distribution curve. The “average person” is a hypothetical concept. However, the 
hypothetical “average person” is used to describe what is normal. Thus, it is also used to 
determine what is abnormal. Mader claims that, “... in order to sense fully the novelty and 
centrality of normalising techniques, attention must be paid to the specific nature of 
statistical measurement" (2007, 1). What this means is that even though the exercise of 
statistics may tell us what is average, and the average does not exist, it does inform us of 
what we determine to be normal. This comparative exercise is also a diagnostic practice. 
Various measurements of the body can be taken, such as heart rate, weight, growth rate, 
oxygen saturation, among many others. These measurements are compared to a range of 
values of which a subset of those values are deemed healthy and normal. When the 
measurement falls in that subset, this is said to be “within accepted limits” or “within 
normal limits”. Values that fall outside of that range are abnormal. Doctors use this 
comparison to diagnose illness. The next step is to cure the illness. Treatment focuses on 
returning the measured value to normal. This is medical correction. The trouble arises at 
the demarcations between acute and chronic illness. This line is blurry, as doctors are 
constantly trying to cure any state of disease that interferes with our ability to function 
normally. Sickness itself is not abnormal. However, chronic illness, like Foucault’s condition 
s that will be discussed later, is viewed as abnormal. This leads directly into Michel 
Foucault’s theory of abnormality. 
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His theory of abnormality is a genealogical account of how the concept of 
abnormality developed from a social perspective. Mader states, “Foucault holds that “the 
norm brings with it a principle of both qualification and correction,’” (2007, 6). Like 
previously mentioned, when we make the claim that something is normal, we are not only 
describing it but also making an intrinsic implication of what the norm should be. His 
account of abnormality demonstrates how the idea of abnormality developed from the 
realm of law and medicine. Now, abnormality is invoked in everyday life to describe those 
who are not necessarily ill, but display qualities that are undesirable and in need of 
correction. 
Foucault’s theory of abnormality is an historical approach to how people in the 
cultural West, especially throughout the Enlightenment to the Victorian age in France, 
developed a concept of everyday abnormal. He describes how a monster in the medical and 
legal system is the root for the idea that potentially dangerous and monstrous abnormality 
all around us. This particular theory is helpful to my project because it shows how, over 
time, we have labelled even the slightest of deviances in ability as abnormal. In social 
contexts, we use medical terminology to organise people and their behaviours into a 
standardised model in order to explain the perception of abnormalities. What is most 
relevant to this particular project is how normalisation is applied to everyday behaviours 
and characteristics abnormal. Foucault’s concept of abnormality begins with the “monster” 
of the 1600s. This monster was a legalistic categorization of a psychotic criminal. In his 
terms, “... the abnormal individual is essentially an everyday monster, a monster that has 
become commonplace" (Foucault, 2003, 57). The abnormal individual develops from 
criminal monstrosity. As the judicial system developed, experts were called as witnesses to 
give testimony about the accused. More and more frequently, the criminal proceedings 
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would be about whether or not the person accused was the sort of person who could and 
would commit a monstrous act. At the same time, the science of psychopathology was 
developing. Courts used psychiatrist's’ expert testimony to determine the guilt of an 
individual. This is based on pathologising the character of the individual. If evidence came 
down to a “he said, she said” argument, an expert would testify to whether or not the 
accused or the accuser had some sort of character trait that would lead them to lie or be 
prone to violence. Thus, Foucault claims, “as crime becomes pathologised, and the expert 
and judge swap roles, this form of control, assessment, and effect of power linked to the 
characterisation of an individual becomes increasingly active" (2003, 38). Penalties for 
those found guilty based on psychopathology were no longer punishment, but correction 
by hospitalisation. Foucault further states 
with the hospitalisation order, the administration carried out by itself a de facto 
synthesis of danger and madness that previously had to be demonstrated 
theoretically by reference to monomania. The administration carries out this 
synthesis not only in exceptional and monstrous subjects, it carries out for everyone 
subject to compulsory hospitalisation. (2003, 142) 
When the court orders hospitalisation for the criminal, the crime is no longer a crime, but 
rather a symptom of illness. Here is where we experience a coupling of illness with 
criminality, and thus, correction with abnormality. Much of these procedures are practiced 
today with being able to plead insanity or mental defect in a court of law. 
In the conceptual development of abnormality, Foucault traces how we implicate a 
particular behaviour as the cause of illness or irregularity. In doing so, certain actions 
deemed immoral are equated with abnormality, or causing further abnormality. We must 
ask, how did this normalisation become a process in both the medical and social realms? 
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Foucault explains how masturbation “becomes the cause, the universal causality of every 
illness" (2003, 241). There is quite some irony in this, because masturbation is so universal 
but historically it has been given the reputation for causing illness. Foucault describes the 
development of masturbation as a medical issue and turned into a social issue. First, 
parents were told to observe their children, to bind them to their bedding, to report to the 
doctor, should they observe them engaging in masturbation. The act of masturbating was a 
symptom, and observation, restraint, and informing authorities was the cure. Then, when 
not in parental care, this fell to other caretakers. The individual sexual practice becomes 
the object of surveillance in the social structure, not just the medicalised familial structure. 
The problem falls to nurses, to nannies, to friends or extended family. It is no longer limited 
to the child, the parents, and the doctor. This process was thought to be necessary to 
prevent a condition of abnormality from forming. The masturbator is described as weak, 
pale, and exhausted from indulgent exertion. When we imagine an ill person, we see in our 
minds an individual who is weak, pale, and oftentimes, exhausted. Or as Foucault describes, 
“all the signs are superimposed in the masturbator’s emaciated and ravaged body" (2003, 
238). Not only that, “we also find the idea that the time it takes to produce its effects is 
absolutely random: An illness of old age may well be due to childhood masturbation” 
(Foucault, 2003, 241). Here we find how the moral judgment of a fairly normal activity is 
made into the cause of any conceivable illness. The child becomes the cause of his own 
condition. The concepts of syndromes and conditions lays the groundwork for the 
justification of a therapeutic process of normalisation. 
The following analysis describes this syndrome and condition framework and 
demonstrates how ordinary behaviours have become medicalised. Once medicalised, a 
behaviour can be subjected to normalisation. These behaviours are grouped together as 
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syndromes and conditions. Anything can be a syndrome, if it falls out of line with whatever 
the “norm” is determined to be. Foucault says “I want to emphasize that, as you can see, 
there is nothing here that is the symptom of an illness: It is a syndrome, that is to say, a 
partial and stable configuration referring to a general condition of abnormality" (2003, 
311). The conceptual development of a particular syndrome can be any collection of less-
than-desirable behaviours that are consequentially pathologised, regardless of how 
arbitrary the symptoms seem. Foucault gives the example of “antivivisection” syndrome, 
where people’s desires to protect animal rights are medicalised into a syndrome. This is 
done “when deviation and automatism increase… there is illness that must be precisely 
defined in terms of this increasing deviation and automatism" (Foucault, 2003, 159). Any 
set of abnormal behaviours can be grouped together to form a syndrome. 
As to Foucault’s idea of conditions, these are said to be unconscious background 
operations that give rise to any number of abnormal behaviours 
What is a condition? As a privileged psychiatric object, a condition is not exactly an 
illness with a starting point, causes, and processes; indeed, it is not an illness at all. 
The condition is a sort of permanent causal background on the basis of which illness 
may develop in a number of processes and episodes. In other words, the condition is 
the abnormal basis upon which illnesses become possible. (Foucault, 2003, 311-
312) 
The condition itself cannot be cured, but it can be managed or contained. In current 
medical literature, a condition would be like the American Psychological Association’s 
personality disorder axis. These disorders operate as abnormal backdrops to explain an 
individual’s particular abnormal pattern of behaviour. Personality disorders may give rise 
to any host of symptomatic psychological disorders. For example, obsessive-compulsive 
 32 
personality disorder is heavily associated with the development of anorexia nervosa. 
According to Foucault, “a condition is not a more or less pronounced characteristic. The 
condition is a real, radical discriminant. The individual who suffers from a condition, who 
has a condition, is not a normal individual. However, the peculiarity of this condition that is 
typical of so-called abnormal individuals is that it has an absolute, total etiological value" 
(Foucault, 2003, 312). Once someone is described as “having a condition”, they can thus be 
“fixed” or normalised. Further, he notes that, “consequently, this notion of condition has a 
formidable capacity for integration: It refers to nonhealth, but it can also bring into its field 
any conduct whatsoever as soon as it is physiologically, psychologically, sociologically, 
morally, and even legally deviant" (Foucault, 2003, 312-313). With the fluidity and 
flexibility of the classification systems used to identify various psychological disorders, any 
behaviour may be called into question. Any set of behaviours can be formed into a 
syndrome that is an expression of an underlying condition. Further, the cause of the 
condition can be traced back to a previous behaviour, like Foucault’s description of 
masturbation. This link back to a condition is how we determine an individual to be 
abnormal. 
Now we must consider how all of this relates to ability. The abnormal status of an 
individual’s ability is how we justify subjecting disabled persons to normalisation. Foucault 
says,  
The difference between disability and monstrosity is revealed at the meeting point, 
the point of friction, between a breach of the natural law table and a breach of the 
law instituted by God or by society, at the point where these two breaches of law 
come together. Disability may well be something that upsets the natural order, but 
disability is not monstrosity because it has a place in civil or canon law. The disabled 
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person may not conform to nature, but the law in some way provides for him. 
Monstrosity, however, is the kind of natural irregularity that calls law into question 
and disables it. Law must either question its own foundations, or its practice, or fall 
silent, or abdicate, or appeal to another reference system, or again invent a 
casuistry. (Foucault, 2003, 64) 
Here, Foucault is separating disability from monstrosity. They differ in their legal 
statuses. Being disabled is not a crime. The disabled individual is seen as “upsetting the 
natural order,” much like monstrous individual, but not by enacting harm on other people. 
However, monstrosity and disability both fall into the realm of abnormality. The difference 
is their perceived offense: the monster breaks the laws of society as the disabled individual 
supposedly breaks the laws of nature. One might make the argument that all who exist are 
perfectly natural, and thus normal, in their existence. But in being disabled, from a societal 
level, the disabled person is abnormal even if the disability is in itself a natural occurrence 
or deviation. Naturalness need not be associated with normality, and unnaturalness with 
abnormality. In being abnormal, the individual in question will be subject to the social 
pressure of normalisation. Foucault does not make this claim directly, but his discussion on 
masturbation addresses how the abnormal quality of the action is not inherent. Rather, 
abnormality is determined by social norms.  
Any person deemed abnormal by experiencing a disabling condition is likely to 
experience “correction” or normalisation. We are told that if we are abnormal, we must 
become normal. Normalisation is expressed as correction such as therapy, medication, or 
surgery, as mocking or ridiculing, as marginalisation, and as structural discrimination and 
oppression. Anyone who is deemed to not fit quite right into the structure of society, who 
has a syndrome or condition, is declared to be in need of “fixing” or pushed towards the 
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standard model of normal. Foucault’s theory of abnormality links nicely to the social model 
of disability in that both abnormality and disability are largely determined by society, not 
by an essential quality of the individual. While abnormality and disability are not the same 
thing, they are often treated similarly in social context.  
For the norm to be relevant, normalisation needs justification. Foucault describes 
this justification as, “this continuum with its therapeutic and judicial poles, this 
institutional mixture, is actually a response to danger" (2003, 34). We justify our 
normalisation as a way to prevent danger from occurring. If, as Foucault says, “a condition 
can produce absolutely anything, at any time, and in any order" (2003, 312), then 
conditions provide a vague and ambiguous justification for some future undesirable 
behaviour. We have seen the development of how we go from the criminal monster to the 
individual with a condition. The individual with a condition is wholly unpredictable. As 
Mader notes 
the crucial component of this homogenisation is the social technology of the norm. 
For it is the notion of a norm and its deviations, rather than a law and its infraction, 
that permits the calibration, correction, gauging, and management that is central to 
biopower. The notion of the norm is what permits power to assume a therapeutic 
guise" (Mader, 2007, 7). 
The norm is the desired outcome for normalisation. It is the measurement by which people 
are compared to determine who needs correction and who does not. The “therapeutic 
guise” of the norm shrouds oppressive measures of normalisation by saying that this is for 
our own good. In this way, those who enforce the norm say to the abnormal, “here, we can 
help you, be like us” rather than embrace variance in behaviour. Many of these abnormal 
individuals are only abnormal in a subjective and arbitrary manner, such as those who 
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have the anti-vivisection syndrome mentioned above. Granted, some abnormal individuals 
do exhibit actual dangerous behavioural patterns. The normalisation process occurs in an 
effort to shield ourselves from the dangers of the abnormal individual with a condition or a 
syndrome. Normalisation does not recognise the difference between someone who might 
be an actual threat to society and someone who just is not quite normal. So long as the 
individual is determined to be abnormal, to have these unpredictable qualities, that is 
enough for normalisation practices to be justified in these views. Actions associated with 
normalisation, such as discrimination and marginalisation, serve to enforce the power and 
dominance of the norm but are actually harmful to individuals in society. 
We make efforts to not marginalise or discriminate, yet we still submit to pressures 
of normalisation by rejecting those perceived as abnormal. By clinging to a specific 
standard of how to be, we make any substantial deviation from that standard a precarious 
place to be. The more we view disability and abnormality as dangerous, the more we 
engage normalisation tactics. The more we engage in normalisation, the more dangerous it 
is to be considered abnormal. As it becomes more dangerous to be abnormal, the more 
people fear becoming abnormal and fear the abnormal. Normalisation feeds itself in a 
vicious cycle. Abnormality is a subjective and relative qualifier, applied to anyone who 
deviates from a socially determined norm. After all, because we judge abnormality to be 
dangerous, we simultaneously create the idea that being abnormal is a dangerous thing to 
be. This creates the cycle in which we call the abnormal dangerous, we subject the 
abnormal to normalisation and oppression, and create the fear that if we are found to be 
abnormal that we too will be harmed.  
The normalisation process is pervasive in the social fabric of the world. Foucault 
describes this process as the familial monitoring of the child masturbator as previously 
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mentioned. This monitoring serves to gather evidence for potential harms and crimes. 
Furthermore, he claims that 
an obvious implication of this is that the connection between crime and madness 
becomes a regular phenomenon for psychiatry rather than the extreme case. Little 
crimes, of course, and little mental illnesses; tiny delinquencies and almost 
imperceptible abnormalities of behaviour essentially constitute the organisational 
and fundamental field of psychiatry" (Foucault, 2003, 163). 
Through the individualised familial lens, more and more behaviours are interpreted as 
potential for wrongdoing or sickness. Every action may be suspicious. In turn, we have 
pulled away from just the dramatic deranged individual who is committing actual crimes. 
Instead we have condemned even the slightest of unusual behaviours as evidence of 
disorder, of abnormality, in need of being normalised. 
Chapter 4: Abnormality in Society 
 Visibility is one of the first factors that render a person abnormal. This chapter 
begins with a discussion on staring, as staring is an action associated with visibility. Staring 
is often a first interaction between two individuals. Viewing abnormality through the act of 
staring, we can see how abnormality is subject to normalisation and oppression. The 
second section address specifically how those with abnormal abilities face oppression. A 
third section engages a specific question regarding whether or not enhanced individuals 
can ever be considered disabled. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the idea that 





Staring and Normalisation 
When we encounter abnormality in the social context, our immediate reaction 
begins the process of how we decide, consciously or subconsciously, to interact with this 
abnormal person. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s discussion on staring begins the 
conversation of how we begin to interact with abnormal seeming individuals. Staring is a 
common first interaction between two people. We do not immediately stare at ordinary 
objects or people unless there is something unusual about them. Garland-Thomson 
describes staring as a means to express dominance, assert control, and assign stigma 
(2009, 40-46). Dominance, control, and stigma are all integral elements of normalisation 
and, consequently, oppression. Garland-Thomson describes some cases of staring as a 
power struggle. The starer starts staring as dominating the staree. The relationship may 
change, but our first impressions of individuals are given a certain level of primacy for how 
we are to continue to engage with this person. Looking through the act of staring, we focus 
on the visible quality of abnormality. Visible abnormality oftentimes determines how one 
may further interact with another person. When confronted with someone who appears 
unusual or unexpected, we stare. Garland-Thomson claims “the surprise that motivates 
staring produces… an expedition in search of information" (2009, 19). When we look at 
people, we take in visual information and process it in order to figure out how to further 
interact. Staring initiates the judgment process that leads to normalising courses of action if 
we determine the individual to be abnormal. 
 Social interactions surrounding beauty can illustrate how staring leads to actions 
associated with normalisation. In the context of attraction and beauty, Garland-Thomson 
claims that, “expectation states theory suggests then that attractiveness is not so much a 
collection of positive bodily attributes, but rather it is the successful presentation of a 
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normative standard" (2009, 37). We are apt to stare at someone who is beautiful or 
someone who is particularly unattractive. Practices of beautification, in which people wear 
certain clothing and apply makeup or even get surgical procedures, are all means to 
conform to a certain standard to be considered attractive or beautiful. Despite widespread 
social efforts to embrace individuality and diversity, there are ever-present subconscious 
forces that push individuals to conform to a normalised ideal of appearance. As Garland-
Thomson states, “at the root of our craving for novelty is an anxious drive to be rid of it so 
that we can sink into a calmer world where nothing startles or demands our visual 
attention, (2009, 19). Many people in a wide variety of cultures go as far as plastic surgery 
to enhance beauty. As a result of this, these individuals create a specific, normalised 
standard of beauty. According to the Asian Plastic Surgery Guide, South Korea has the 
highest rate of plastic surgery procedures in the world. In a 2013 South Korean national 
beauty pageant, criticism was garnered of participants of the contest for looking too much 
alike. Plastic surgery itself is a beautification and normalisation procedure by which 
surgeons are trained in the same or similar techniques that lead to results that are 
strikingly similar from person to person. Though, this incidence was blamed on the 
publication of Photoshopped images of the contestants. However, we may consider the act 
of using Photoshop to publicise these participant’s images as resulting in the same effect - 
that regardless of the technique used, we have an ideal standardised norm for beauty. Of 
course, plastic surgery is practiced outside of South Korea. In the US, individuals go through 
plastic surgery with a wider variety of results, possibly due to a more diverse population 
base. Though perhaps performed more covertly, we also value sameness and being normal 
despite outward slogans to embrace diversity. 
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The intent of beautification is to increase the beauty of the individual. There are 
limits to the benefits associated with this increase. Extraordinary beauty is a case of 
abnormality. Beautification can only be allowed to go so far before we say, too much, too 
beautiful, no longer acceptable, and begin to undermine the one who has too much beauty. 
Garland-Thomson’s idea that “we are obliged to act, feel, look, and be normal - at almost 
any cost" (2009, 31) highlights this limitation. The subconscious social current towards 
normalisation is powerful enough that “people who deviate from the formal, functional, or 
behavioural norms lose the advantages of being normal. In this way, the label abnormal 
reduces people’s economic and social status and relegates them to the outer edges of the 
human community" (Garland-Thomson, 2009, 31). We marginalise people when they fall 
outside of the bounds of what we accept as appropriately beautiful or attractive. Typically, 
this is thought of as the plight of the ugly. Daniel Hamermesh describes in his book Beauty 
Pays: Why Attractive People Are More Successful how abnormal appearance, perceived 
beauty or ugliness, has an effect on wage earning. Beautiful people make more money than 
average looking people. People who are considered unattractive make less money than 
average looking people. Less considered are the normalising effects from the other end of 
the spectrum. In a review study, researchers find that attractiveness can undermine job-
seeking efforts, especially in jobs associated with specific gender roles (Johnson, Podratz, 
Dipboye, and Gibbens, 2010, 301). The plight of the overly beautiful or attractive is 
overlooked because we value beauty in such a way that there is an assumption that being 
beautiful is always good. Often assumed is that what is good could be made even better if 
there were more of the good thing. Unfortunately, it is not always the case. What is 
beneficial in some scenarios is not beneficial in all scenarios. Beauty can work against a 
person in many situations. It is not the norm to be considered to be generally beautiful by 
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various cultural standards. Excess beauty is also an abnormality. In terms of appearance, 
being beautiful in and of itself is not exactly normal. Applying the term beautiful to an 
individual differentiates that person from people of average or below average (ugly) 
appearances. While we have expanded beauty to come in various shapes, forms, sizes, 
saying that everyone is beautiful makes the norm change from a standardised model of of 
beauty and attraction to one in which all people are beautiful. In doing so, we change the 
meaning of beauty to no longer mean someone different, but that beauty itself becomes a 
set of variances rather than standardisations. In the end, being too beautiful or too 
unattractive results in being treated as someone who just is not quite normal enough. 
Abnormality may be fetishized or perceived as exotic. While certain rules of beauty may 
apply, even the fetishized or exotic must adhere to some normalised standard to be 
considered attractive and to maintain a successful functional status in society. These 
observations demonstrate how an abnormal appearance, regardless of its perceived benefit 
or deficit, pushes people to experience themselves as socially abnormal as well as visually 
abnormal. Being abnormal disrupts the patterns of social norms of acceptance leading to 
rejection. “The sight of an unexpected body - that is to say, a body that does not conform to 
our expectations for an ordinary body - is compelling because it disorders expectations" 
(Garland-Thomson, 2009, 37). An abnormal appearance disrupts our expectations leading 
us to uncertainty. Normality is predictable. Abnormality is unpredictable. While it may only 
be a split second in our first reactions, it is still the fact that we do not treat abnormally 
appearing individuals the same way we treat normal looking individuals. We do not 
express curiosity in the appearance of the normal in the way that we do when someone 
looks different. 
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 When evaluating reactions to abnormal appearance, we can see how this holds true 
in the case of abnormal abilities. We do not easily accept or embrace those with abnormal 
ability because it is too demanding or confusing for our attention. We have to take the time 
to figure out how the ability is different. If the ability is lacking in a particular way, now we 
must ourselves figure out how to accommodate for that deficit or work with the other 
person to figure out how to meet goals using other means. To have a typical quality of 
ability and be around someone who is disabled or naturally inclined to a particular task, 
mentally or physically, changes interpersonal dynamic until familiarity is achieved. Simply 
put, it is easier to work with someone you immediately recognise to be have an average or 
normal range of ability.  
A particular case of how we might react to seeing abnormality is the case of assistive 
mobile devices. We can look at how we view readily visible machinery such as wheelchairs, 
walkers, and canes for the cases of disability: “Seeing disability reminds us of what Bryan S. 
Turner calls ‘ontological contingency,’ the truth of our body’s vulnerability to the 
randomness of fate" (Garland-Thomson, 2009, 19). When we see disability, we might 
express disgust due to the fear that this may soon happen to us. Though, perhaps we would 
have less fear if we did not reject and oppress disabled people? When we see visible 
assistive measures such as wheelchairs or prosthetic limbs, we think of how difficult it 
must be to lose an ability we are accustomed to having, such as mobility. We do not think 
about these things when we cannot see that another person is using alternative means to 
assist in personal mobility. On the other end of the spectrum are using similar devices with 
the intent of enhancing one’s already existing ability. Exoskeletons are being developed 
now to replace wheelchairs for individuals coping with paralysis. However, these 
exoskeletons are also being developed for non-therapeutic purposes. What happens when 
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exoskeletons make walking a possibility for those who cannot ordinarily walk? Further, 
how do we view an exoskeleton that is not meant as assistance, but as an enhancement for 
someone who wants to move faster or more deftly beyond their baseline ability? Would 
seeing exoskeletons in use more frequently make them seem more normal? Perhaps. So far 
most of these things have only shown up in fiction and fantasy. But, we look to those who 
can do more, who are enhanced, to do more. In our fictitious worlds, X-Men and Heroes 
both demonstrate how we may react to individuals who have these abnormal but 
supposedly beneficially enhanced abilities. The abnormally abled individuals are expected 
to live in the fringes of society and save the world that rejects them at the same time. Our 
imagined accounts warn us of how we can go wrong. They stand as lessons as to why we 
should not marginalise people who are different. What will we do should such abilities 
become reality? We already fetishize individuals with extreme natural abilities. Half of our 
television programming is dedicated to gawking over the amazingness of someone who has 
a particular superior ability. Off camera, however, these individuals live radically different 
lives that do not fall into the socially expected and accepted norms, even though we 
approve of their abnormal abilities. When we do this, we are approving the ability without 
approving of the person with the ability. Biographical accounts of Olympians and concert 
musicians demonstrate how the lives of people with extraordinary abilities are abnormal. 
Because of their extraordinary ability and passion, such individuals do not fit into the 
normalised social fabric of everyday life. This is not limited to people who have attained a 
higher social status because of their ability. Consider a lifelong professional gymnast. In the 
community of gymnasts, this person is normal. In the broader social world, this person 
discloses their status as a gymnast. Curiosity and judgment of this person follow. 
Assumptions are made, followed by personal questions, requests for demonstration, and 
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otherwise potentially dehumanising social interaction. This is not limited to well-known 
professionals in their fields. The ordinary musician is often treated as a music box rather 
than a person who plays music. Because someone does something considered special, they 
are frequently subject to objectification and commodification. Exchanges become less 
about forming a relationship between people and more about about forming a relationship 
between spectator and spectacle, or consumer and product. The moment of disclosing the 
abnormality becomes a pivotal point in interaction. Some do not get a choice in disclosure, 
if their abnormalities are worn on the outside. They are subjected to a dehumanising 
process just by being in public. If viewed as too abnormal, an enhanced individual, 
regardless of therapeutic value of the enhancement, is unlikely to be treated as a normal 
person but rather as something else, something other, something abnormal. While these 
examples are demonstrative of day-to-day examples of exploitation, we can look at how 
such exploitation can become systematised when we look at how institutionalised 
enhancement already is becoming in the professional athletic world. The fact that such 
rigour is required to prevent enhancement technologies from being used in athletic 
competition is evidence enough to show how enhancement itself becomes an exploitative 
component. Athletes are faced with the choice of submitting to enhancement technologies 
or lessening their odds of winning and maintaining their contracts. If they submit to 
enhancement, they may be subjected to any number of exploitative measures to keep them 
in line based solely on the fact that they have engaged in enhancement technologies. 
The visibility component is largely how we see discrimination and oppression in 
real-life tangible action. New visible technology is at a precarious state of whether or not it 
will become a norm. Bluetooth headsets became a norm. We do not ordinarily equate such 
a device as an enhancement, just as a tool that we use to extend an ability or activity. 
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However, many enhancements are just that – tools that we use to extend certain abilities. 
We do not immediately differentiate the role of an enhancement, whether it has a 
therapeutic value or non-therapeutic value. Other visible technologies that augment our 
abilities did not catch onto society, though, like Google Glass. If one immediately appears 
too abnormal, it does not matter what role the abnormality plays. The abnormality 
provokes curiosity and attention. What we see at first is a visible anomaly in the form of a 
disabled person using an enhancement to achieve a normal expected range of function or a 
typically able person using a non-therapeutic enhancement to increase the range of 
function. As it stands, more people engage in therapeutic enhancements in the social visual 
field than they engage in significant visible non-therapeutic enhancements. We see 
wheelchairs more often than we see exoskeletons or Google Glass or some other external 
enhancement. Those using therapeutic enhancements are often doing so to correct for a 
disability and to increase their ability to function in less than accessible environments. In 
effect, they are enacting normalisation. Despite their efforts, though, these disabled 
individuals, with their abnormalities worn on the outside, are subjected to discrimination 
and oppression, sometimes with immediate first encounters. Though, if a disabled person 
can “pass” for an able person, they may face with more covert forms of discriminatory 
actions. Rather than direct violence, a person who hides their disability or enhancement 
may be judged untrustworthy. Those who try to normalise are discriminated against and 
oppressed despite their efforts, even if the larger society deems their efforts acceptable or 
normal for their situation or disability. It is expected that disabled individuals try to be as 
normal as possible. In this way, a therapeutic enhancement may be more acceptable by 
social norms than non-therapeutic enhancements as it reinforces a normal ability model. 
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 It is easier, simpler, and more efficient to engage those whose abilities we can safely 
assume to be normal or, at the very least, similar to our own. Of course, visibility of 
abnormality is not the only way by which we determine someone to be abnormal. 
Oftentimes abnormality is not made apparent until engaging in further interaction. 
Regardless of how abnormality is determined by the individual, there is hesitancy in 
continued engagement with that person. This hesitancy, that leads to treating someone 
differently, is what begins the initial first actions that lead to actions of discrimination and 
oppression toward abnormal individuals.  
Oppression and Abnormality 
After an initial encounter, we set a course for how we interact with each other. Our 
interactions range from rejection and acceptance, from oppression to cooperation. Marion 
Iris Young states that “all oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to 
develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings” 
(2014, 4). Oppressive actions violate individual liberty, personal rights, and limit the ability 
to act autonomously. The combination effect of violating all of these creates the injustice 
found in oppression. Recall Chapter Two, the arguments concerning whether or not we 
should enhance. The arguments rarely involve justice in society until we turn towards 
resource allocation and management of technology. When we look at how society 
pressures the abnormal to normalize, we see the violation of personal liberties that effect 
social levels of injustice. Here we can take justice to mean those actions by which we treat 
all others with the utmost humane respect and dignity. We may invoke Martha Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach, which requires a tall order as to what is just. The capabilities 
approach makes the claim that individuals must be afforded the resources necessary to 
flourish. In failing to do so, injustice may occur. Where injustice occurs, oppressive 
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measures thrive in the place of beneficial fulfillment. In the framework of abnormality, we 
have an overwhelming pressure to be as normal as possible. The irony of normalization in 
our current society is that we do not necessarily provide the means to normalize. One 
might say that this is an injustice if we decide that normalizing the abnormal ought to be 
the priority that we take. However, if we are seeking to disrupt the norm, providing the 
means to normalize becomes itself an injustice if that is the intended purpose. In plainer 
terms, providing therapeutic enhancement then becomes unjust. Of course this is an 
exceptionally counterintuitive outcome. The example highlights how normalization cannot 
function in a properly just society. However, if we are providing the means to upset the 
norm, partially by way of technological enhancement, we must take it on the approach for 
all enhancements in order for it to be considered just. This would contribute to a 
destabilization of the norm and a weakening of the oppressive power of normalization if 
done in an appropriate manner. While oppression serves to maintain aspects of dominance, 
it also serves to enforce a status quo. One major function of oppression is to maintain the 
specific norms of society. It has a dehumanising effect on those who are oppressed. 
Oppression also reinforces power structures and maintains control over people and Others. 
Oppression alienates those who are deemed unworthy of belonging. Oppression results in 
great injustice for those who are unaccepted. A certain power is associated with 
maintaining a normal appearance, and that is one of being able to live without being 
oppressed. Oppression results from how society copes with abnormality. By forcing 
individuals into a predictable model of normality, we tell these individuals to either 
conform or be subject to oppression.  
 Being abnormal comes with significant challenge on the part of the individual. This 
is especially true if the abnormality is readily visible. This unacceptability occurs regardless 
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of whether the perceived abnormality is traditionally thought of as a deficit or a benefit. A 
long history of oppression has already been established regarding disabled individuals. 
Disabled individuals face all types of oppression as a direct result of their abilities being 
perceived as explicitly abnormal. When disabled people are not afforded the means to fulfil 
their needs, they experience oppression. They often lack access to resources or must rely 
on others to help them meet their needs to survive. Society does not ordinarily see why the 
burden for accessibility should be on the shoulders of the abled. After all, it is the so-called 
normal people who are not disabled. But, as we do not live in the world without each other, 
people with disabilities and differing needs have just as much of a right to be able to fulfil 
their needs and live meaningful lives. Garland-Thomson focuses on the bodies of disabled 
individuals to demonstrate the cultural nuances and norms of staring. We are in fact quite 
often startled to encounter an individual who is missing a limb. The more dramatic the 
visual disturbance, the more we are likely to stare in order to interpret what exactly it is we 
are seeing. In staring, we must take the time to consider our next actions towards another 
individual. The affective responses resulting from our initial interactions, curiosity and 
disgust, lead into how we go from passing by a person to developing some sort of 
relationship with that person. We make judgments in split seconds, to discern who is safe 
and who is dangerous. The discriminatory practice is laden with repercussions for how 
much we allow another person to play a role in our lives. Staring plays a role in oppression 
as it signals the abnormality of someone else.  
One of the main components of this paper is to question whether or not enhanced 
individuals can face discrimination or oppression as a result of their enhanced ability. The 
ability to conform to a norm is one that many people do not have. Therapeutic 
enhancements are made to bring a disabled person up to a normal level of function. As 
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such, therapeutic enhancement reinforces our traditional conceptions of ability. Non-
therapeutic measures are taken to move away from that normal level of function. Non-
therapeutically enhanced individuals are making a conscious decision to be abnormal. The 
latter type of enhancement is often desired to increase the ability to compete more 
effectively in our society. An enhancement of this sort extends the capability of an already 
present ability. In doing so, an enhancement of this sort also reinforces the norm but 
coming from the opposite direction as therapeutic enhancements. These enhancements are 
often made in socially valued and accepted abilities, such as cognitive performance and 
emotion regulation. While we may wish to personally benefit from our choice to engage in 
non-therapeutically enhance ourselves, we are not doing so with the idea that we will be 
rejected for improving ourselves. Non-therapeutic enhancements are made to extend 
socially accepted normal abilities, to compete in an already unequal arena. When making 
the choice to have an abnormal level of ability, we do not agree to being subject to 
discriminatory or oppressive actions. We often view an enhancement as a beneficial change 
in someone’s ability rather than something that can be a target for discrimination. 
 Oppression comes in a variety of forms, to a wide array of degrees. Young describes 
five particular modalities of oppression: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, 
cultural domination, and violence. In order to properly describe how individuals with 
various enhancements and their supporters might experience oppression overall, we must 
take each oppressive measure in turn. We ought to note that Young claims that there is “a 
consensus emerging that many different groups must be said to be oppressed in our 
society, and that no single form of oppression can be assigned causal or moral primacy" 
(Young, 2014, 6). This is to say that oppression may be experienced by any social group. 
This is also to say that no form of oppression is more morally wrong than another, though 
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Young does make the point that marginalisation has particularly devastating effects in 
everyday life. 
Oppression is and can be experienced by therapeutically and non-therapeutically 
enhanced individuals. Exploitation may be most relevant to those seeking abnormal ability 
status, such as those who practice non-therapeutic enhancement. Young describes 
exploitation “through a steady process of the transfer of the results of the labour of one 
social group to benefit another” (2014, 14). Labour is a product of ability. Exploitation is an 
unethical means of taking what one person does to benefit another person. Exploitation is 
often achieved by lying, stealing, lack of transparency, and abuse in order to essentially 
cheat someone out of what they have earned. This occurs without consent. An implicit 
component of exploitation is the objectification of the individual being exploited. Enhanced 
individuals may be subject to exploitation if they do not have the means to protect 
themselves from predatory individuals. Enhanced individuals may be exploited particularly 
based on the fact that a particular valued ability is the one they have enhanced. A non-
therapeutically enhanced ability is exploitable in specific contexts, often taken outside of 
the individual’s intention for enhancing that ability. One example would be enhancing the 
ability to form memories. This enhancement could be performed for both therapeutic and 
nontherapeutic purposes. In the therapeutic context, a neural implant could be used to 
correct for dementia or amnesia. Alternatively, someone may wish to be able to remember 
everything that they have ever experienced and be able to share those memories with 
others. This enhancement can be exploited in such a way that others could gain control of it 
and use it for malicious purposes without the consent of the individual with the 
enhancement. Some individuals wish to enhance certain abilities so that they can use them 
to better their own performances in their desired fields of career or recreational activities. 
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Any ability that has a commodifiable value can be exploited. In particular, exploitation of 
enhanced individuals for entertainment purposes can be established through 
entertainment if we follow the lineage of circuses, side shows, and freak shows. Historically 
speaking, naturally endowed individuals were involuntarily put on display as a result of 
their abnormality. Individuals with exceptional strength or flexibility have been exploited 
and put on display as spectacles so long as anyone is curious to see them. This form of 
entertainment is still practiced today with extraordinary abilities sold as spectacle to an all-
too-eager-to-consume-the-oddity public. An individual who takes a medication or alter 
their genetic makeup to enhance a certain ability may also face exploitation even if they 
wanted that particular enhancement in order to perform as that type of entertainer. 
Because they have that ability, they are potential targets of exploitation for entertainment 
value even though they chose to undergo an enhancement for the purpose of performing as 
an entertainer. Having a greater ability to perform creates a more desirable target for 
entertainment exploitation. In enhancing their ability, they are not consenting to being 
taken advantage of, lied to, or cheated out of just business practices. By enhancing a 
particular ability, such as flexibility, the individual is not agreeing to shady business 
practices. If their enhancement is illegal for participating in an event, such as doping in 
cycling, and someone discovers it, that individual could be subjected to blackmail rather 
than answering to authorities for repercussions. In the case of entertainment, increasing 
flexibility through enhancement technology and not just training is not consent for being 
subjected to exploitation. In the case of sport, exploitation is rampant without 
enhancements. College athletes are exploited for their abilities in order to make profits. 
They are not paid, though they may receive scholarships for their sport-related 
endeavours. Scholarships come with requirements that must be upheld. They also come 
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with certain unspoken expectations, in particular success. Athletes who enter into these 
scholarship contracts do not always have the best guidance upon agreeing to them. If an 
athlete is injured, they may be subjected to losing their funding. Performing arts 
scholarships are also subject to potentially ill advisement and overly demanding additional 
work. Their contracts often leave them in precarious situations. Why would this be 
different for enhanced individuals who participate in entertainment or sport? Enhanced 
athletics is currently condemned by sanctioned sporting organisations. This relegates 
enhanced individuals to competing in unsanctioned events where there exists immense 
potential for exploitation. However, the city of Zurich will be host to the world’s first 
“cyborg Olympics,” dubbed the Cybathlon, where therapeutic enhancements are 
encouraged. The event is currently limited to participation for those individuals who utilise 
therapeutic enhancements. While currently enhancements of non-disabled individuals are 
not allowed in sanctioned sporting events, sport has the potential to go the way of beauty 
pageantry where contests are split up between “natural” and “enhanced” versions of the 
same competition. While this may remedy the situation of mixing enhanced and 
unenhanced individuals for particular events, it does not address issues associated with 
sports - exploitation. 
A second form of oppression faced by enhanced individuals is marginalisation. 
Marginalisation can be experienced by both therapeutically and non-therapeutically 
enhanced individuals. Supporters of radical enhancements may face some marginalisation, 
but support for other enhancements is generally accepted. Young associates material 
deprivation with marginalisation. Deprivation occurs with social outcasting and lack of 
support (Young, 2014, 18). While we frequently disapprove of non-therapeutically 
enhanced individuals by declaring their enhancements to be morally wrong or violations 
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against nature, we do not deny them access to their regular needs. Non-therapeutically 
enhanced individuals may not be allowed to participate in certain areas of life, such as 
competitions, but this is not infringing on their ability to meet their needs to live a 
reasonably fulfilling life. This disallowance extends to therapeutically enhanced individuals 
as well. Therapeutically enhanced individuals are not necessarily marginalised for their 
enhancements. They are most likely marginalised for their perceived disability, even 
though they are trying to obtain normal function. Outside of competition, non-
therapeutically enhanced individuals and supporters of such enhancements are subject to 
moral disgust. 
Violence is another modality of oppression enhanced individuals face, especially if 
their enhancements are immediately visible or noticeable. For violence to count as a matter 
of oppression, it must be systematic. Violence against disabled persons with therapeutic 
enhancements is well documented in the literature and media. We do not have any solid 
statistics regarding violence against non-therapeutically enhanced individuals. A specific 
case of violence against an enhanced individual has been reported, by Steve Mann. He 
reported in 2012 of being attacked at a McDonald’s in France on the basis of his wearable 
technology. He developed what he calls EyeTap. The device fits over the eye and records 
what you see. You “see through” the lens on the EyeTap in that it displays a computerised 
version through the camera with the display fitted and calibrated over the organic eye. In 
fact, it is somewhat similar to Google Glass in that it also can encode data and augment 
what the wearer sees. Steve Mann does not use this technology to make up for a disability. 
The device is worn to see things in the world that we ordinarily would not see and also to 
be able to recall more of what we have seen than we ordinarily would be able to remember 
without assistance. Use of devices such as EyeTap and Google Glass are subject to 
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considerable controversy as their use records other people without their permission. This 
broaches sensitive questions in surveillance performed by private individuals. One element 
of this attack is the violation of privacy or the expectation to not be recorded by private 
individuals whilst attending to everyday affairs out in the world. But this is secondary to 
the fact that the device was so visible. Had the device not been visible, thus available to 
provoke curiosity and questioning, the other people in the restaurant would not have 
known that they were being recorded by a machine that was not owned or operated by the 
business or the government. Had Mann been wearing a contact lens that had the same 
capabilities as his EyeTap device, he likely would not have been attacked unless he 
somehow made known to others that he was observing them through enhanced means. If 
one is enhanced, yet the enhancement is covert or the individual visibly passes for normal, 
it is more likely that person will be judged as normal and acceptable. 
Another kind of violence can occur in enhancement cases. Certain enhancements are 
mechanical or have wireless capabilities. As such, they are subject to all the harms relevant 
to any other electronic device. Hacking wireless enabled electronics that are integrated into 
bodies is a serious threat that can be managed to a degree. Other issues regarding 
mechanical specifics would apply, though, including tampering with electronics, batteries, 
parts, electromagnetic pulses, x-rays, and so forth. Special precautions are taken by those 
who have such devices, but they are not without threat of technological violence.  
Cultural dominance is the overarching principle of the oppressive modalities. Our 
current culture condemns certain forms of enhancement technologies, while embracing 
others. Recall the previously mentioned studies regarding using genetic enhancement to 
prevent disability anomalies. Up to 80% of Americans approved of using genetic 
manipulation to prevent a deadly genetic abnormality. But what about a survivable genetic 
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abnormality that results in disability? It seems that the American population is split 
according to a Pew Research poll conducted in August, 2014. As for non-health related 
genetic manipulation, the same poll found that up to 83% of Americans considered using 
genetic manipulation to increase intelligence was “taking medical enhancements too far.” 
Surveys performed Hart Research Associates in May 2015 showed that opinions regarding 
editing human DNA were mixed at best.  These results are similar to polls from another 
survey, conducted in 2014, by performed by YouGov that reflected up to 72% of Americans 
either strongly or somewhat disapproving of genetically modifications for increasing 
intelligence or other “special traits” and 72% worried that scientists are “playing God” with 
such technologies. Enhancement technologies fascinate us from a fictional perspective, as 
demonstrated by the overwhelming science fiction and fantasy genres. However, we do not 
embrace the use of many of the enhancements illustrated in our imagined worlds. We 
support therapeutic enhancements that bring disabled individuals in line with the “normal” 
part of society (normalisation), but reject more dramatic, non-therapeutic enhancements 
(abnormalisation). This creates a gap in what we view as acceptable and unacceptable. 
Making oneself purposefully abnormal is frowned upon. The blurriness between 
therapeutic enhancement, preventative medicine, and non-therapeutic enhancement 
remains, mostly demarcated by a sense of some enhancements go too far in changing the 
human body. Early opinions on vaccines and some contemporary opinions on vaccines 
challenge the use of preventative measures, frequently citing safety concerns and less 
frequently “playing God” concerns. While we may embrace some preventative measures, in 
the case of preventing deadly genetic conditions, we do not embrace preventing all 
illnesses. As just noted, the US is split on the prevention of non-lethal congenital 
abnormalities. We may take many steps in our lives to prevent illnesses that we 
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encountered on a daily basis, such as flu, food poisoning, allergies, and the like, but only a 
small percentage of the population takes extreme steps to attempt to prevent every illness. 
Some argue that preventing illness is unnatural, and will even go out of their way to induce 
certain illnesses under the idea that contracting a particular illness will fortify the immune 
system. While the human body is capable of fighting off many illnesses without medical 
intervention, many diseases come with potential long-term effects. So, we must ask what 
the prevention priority really is. For one, we try to prevent the diseases that threaten 
human existence the most. Then we try to prevent severely disabling diseases. The tricky 
part is where the line is drawn in preventing disabling conditions. As resources develop 
and norms shift, fewer disabling conditions may be on the slate for prevention. Down’s 
syndrome was once grounds for abortion. Now, legislation is being passed to prevent the 
abortion of children with Down’s syndrome. While our overarching culture is neither for 
nor against prevention, it seems opposed to enhancement. The opposition to enhancement 
follows a similar pattern in how we might accept it. The more radical the enhancement, the 
more likely it is to be opposed. A more radical enhancement in this case could possibly be 
the ability to fly using wings or some external physiological addition to the body. The more 
convenient, relevant, and covert the enhancement, the more likely it might be accepted. 
Such an enhancement could be fairly dramatic for the individual, perhaps maybe the ability 
to be immune to all illnesses. As a whole, the practice of enhancement in general is not 
subject to cultural dominance though some extreme forms of enhancement might be. 
Non-therapeutic enhancement that extends an already present or valued ability 
threatens the norm of an average ability. In that way, enhancement is a clear threat to 
disabled individuals as they are continuously subjected to normalisation. However, other 
enhancements that add different abilities increase the pool of abilities. This effectively 
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dilutes the strength of a norm. The use of cognitive enhancing medication by students is 
rising. Universities have difficulty with admissions due to heavy competition of more and 
more students who have perfect or near perfect scores. While universities have always had 
admission criteria, the criteria have been raised over the years as more and more students 
are performing at top levels. Use of cognitive enhancements turns this into an even tighter 
competition. Overall, it leaves out lower performing students altogether. In a society where 
a degree is practically necessary to survive, this means we can do a few things. We can limit 
the use of cognitive enhancements to those who perform poorly. This would be subjecting 
those students to normalisation, however, and violating their personal freedoms. We could 
ban the use of cognitive enhancements from academic settings and subject students to drug 
testing as we do athletes. Such a ban would be tricky to enforce and likely face backlash and 
accusations of privacy rights violations. Given that education up through a certain age is 
required, such drug testing would be implicitly required and incite additional surveillance. 
Another route we could take is to shift cultural values so that the value of a student is not 
determined by the prestige of university admission. This route would take away the 
incentive for enhancement for competitive means, but leave developing enhancement for 
the sake of enhancement. Trying to do something like this is essentially impossible, though 
we could make small moves over time to discourage the use of unnecessary enhancements. 
Yet another possibility is to separate those enhanced students from those who are not 
enhanced. We already separate those who cannot participate in a classroom of typically 
able students. We also separate out those students who outperform others with gifted and 
honours classes. This is based on the idea that such a separation assists in the ability to 
address the variety of needs of different students. In a class of 20, with one teacher, and 
each student having a radically different set of abilities ranging from enhancements to 
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severe disability, the quality of education possible is virtually non-existent. If four teachers 
are present, the class may be split up into groups of sizes that have students of the most 
similar types and levels of ability. And here we have separation to meet specific needs. We 
already take this approach to education in most cases, even with enhancement being 
brought into the picture. If enhancement is brought into the classroom, the only thing that 
would really need to change is the addition of a new classroom and a new teacher to meet 
the additional needs of a new group of students. There was no norm in the original class 
except for a norm of impossibility. Now, there are four separate classes with four separate 
norms. They could be compared – maybe. But maybe they should not be compared. While 
we all have similar capabilities, our overall ability to do a wide variety of activities varies 
from person to person. Those enhanced students have different needs than those who are 
not enhanced. The problem is that after education, the enhanced individuals might be 
found to be more desirable for “better” jobs. And herein lies the biggest problem. How we 
value vocation and wealth ultimately determines the means by which norms will be shifted. 
So long as a society continues a fierce competition for vast amounts of wealth or being first 
or the best, the norms will never favour anyone who does does not participate. So, ideally, 
this route, along with the impossible one preceding it, would likely be the best ways to 
address the norm shifting issues that non-therapeutic enhancements bring to the table.   
This analysis demonstrates how enhanced individuals can face oppression due to 
their enhanced abilities, particularly if the enhanced ability utilises a noticeable bodily 
addition. As a result, we can say that people face a variety of forms of oppression due to 
abnormal ability, regardless of whether or not that ability is thought to be a deficit or a 
benefit. Total oppression, however, may be reserved for those with disabilities and not 
necessarily those with enhanced abilities. 
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Disability and Enhanced Abilities 
 An interesting question that comes from discussing enhancements and disabilities is 
whether or not enhanced individuals may become disabled. Enhanced individuals who are 
not utilising enhancement technologies to correct a disability certainly remain disabled in 
some way. First of all, abilities are not necessarily dependent on each other despite 
interacting and influencing each other. Second, enhancement is not necessarily a global 
quality. Neither is disability. Global in this sense is that the entire person is not enhanced or 
disabled. We tend to designate people as “disabled” or “enhanced” if their abilities differ in 
only one particular capacity. Abilities must be viewed both separately and together. As an 
example, just because a person has an enhanced memory, does not mean that person is also 
able to walk. The enhanced memory, regardless of whether it is brought about by taking a 
medication or a neural implant, does not change the fact that the individual may or may not 
have legs and simultaneously not have therapeutic measures to aid in mobility. This means 
that the individual is both, enhanced and disabled at the same time.  
More to the point is whether or not the enhanced ability itself can be disabling. In 
the sense that any range of abilities is subject to deficit or a lack of environmental 
affordances in which to express that ability, an enhanced ability can certainly be disabled 
from its usual mode of operating. An enhanced ability can be returned to a baseline state 
and lose its enhanced quality. This may not make the individual globally disabled in a 
medical or social sense. Alternatively, the ability may be lost altogether. If a neural implant 
that enhances memory stops working, it is effectively disabled. Further, if it stops working 
and the individual loses all memory, the ability to remember is gone entirely and disability 
of memory occurs. Alternatively, an enhanced ability can take on a quality of disability in 
that it could be rendered useless, thus being viewed through the social perspective 
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disability. If the environment does not afford the use of an ability, the ability is rendered 
useless. If that person has come to depend on having that particular ability, it then becomes 
a disability. 
Chapter 5: Transhumanism 
 After a lengthy discussion of disabilities and abnormality, let us return to the idea of 
radical human enhancement. Radical human enhancement changes certain features of what 
we often associate with what it means to be human. Nick Bostrom uses the term 
posthuman, whereas others such as Max More and Natasha Vita-More use the term 
transhuman. The term is essentially interchangeable in the present context. 
Transhumanism is a distinct form of enhancement, but it is a special case in that 
transhumanists are seeking to alter their human form in order to become something that is 
not human but retains some human-like attributes. This translates into a being that is no 
longer human per se, but transhuman. The focus then will be that transhumanists will 
likely face forms of oppression rather than acceptance because they are so different from 
the human species norm. The transhuman extends the concept of personhood to include a 
potentially radically untraditional human form. 
In the practice of radical enhancement, transhumanists move beyond our concepts 
of acceptable everyday enhancement. Even by enhancement norms, transhumanists are on 
the farthest edge of the spectrum in their desires and development. They also may face a 
unique set of problems related to concepts found in the social theory of disability as well. 
Radical human enhancement will not necessarily face the same fate as disability, but the 
discussions from disability theory can inform some of what life might be like if such 
extreme enhancement is enacted. 
According to the Transhumanist FAQ, transhumanism is defined as: 
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The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability 
of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially 
by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to 
greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities.  
Some proponents of transhumanism view the philosophy as seeking the next step in 
evolution for humankind. In the context of ability, transhumanism aims to enhance human 
ability beyond what our species can already do, to a point that we might question whether 
the resulting person is human or something else. This enhancement is thought to 
potentially break the species-typical boundary of human ability resulting in someone who 
is transhuman. That is, while this person may share with humans the same DNA or physical 
form, they are distinctly something different from a human who has not undergone such 
procedures. However, this radically enhanced person may retain specific qualities of 
personhood correlated to being human. Max More separates transhumanism from 
humanism stating that “humanism tends to rely exclusively on educational and cultural 
refinement to improve human nature whereas transhumanists want to apply technology to 
overcome limits imposed by our biological and genetic heritage" (2013, 4). I disagree with 
this statement, as we engage in cultural activities for a multitude of reasons, not merely 
improvement. We also use technology in ways to overcome our limits all the time. For 
instance, we developed cars and airplanes to travel distances much more quickly than 
thought possible. Humanists also engage in using technology to improve our lives. The line 
of demarcation is that humanists do not necessarily seek to transcend human biology. 
A result of transhumanist ideals are radical human enhancements. I’ve mentioned 
several in previous chapters but would like to focus again on the most thematic in the 
literature. These include the eradication of aging (immortality), the integration of 
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mechanical enhancements into the human body (cyborgs), and uploading of consciousness 
to machine technology (uploading). At face value, none of these enhancements necessarily 
meet a criterion for being visually abnormal if they are performed in such a way that the 
person still looks like a species-typical human. The abnormality would lie in the unseen 
ability. In fact, many of the current technological developments are subtler or covert. The 
technology often proposed for enhancing certain abilities are nanobots or neural implants. 
Essentially, devices that are integrated into the human body. Developing technology in this 
way is not only for the sake of convenience or efficiency for the ability, but also because 
developers do understand that looking too strange can result in any number of undesired 
social responses. 
Someone who is enhanced in such a way would be practically undetectable unless 
by using scanning technology, the individual tells you, or, the machinery enhances the 
individual’s behaviour in some readily noticeable way. Say, for instance, a neural implant 
allows you to remember everything you’ve ever experienced in your entire life. This is an 
ability that is currently beyond the range of humans. It works by recording every single 
perception and allowing for specific recall of any given moment in which you have existed. 
The British television show Black Mirror, in the episode entitled “The Entire History of 
You,” uses this sort of technology as a major feature in the plot. In it, the device is referred 
to as a ‘grain’. You can call up memories and display them on the wall for others to see. You 
can fast forward, rewind, zoom, and change volume. This enhancement is far beyond what 
an ordinary human can do. And it is entirely abnormal. But, unless someone knows that we 
have this implant, we can still blend in with everyone else and avoid discrimination from 
species-typical humans. The technology could be used against you. In this same imagined 
universe of Black Mirror, another episode entitled “White Christmas” imagines how police 
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and judicial systems would be able to prevent an individual from lying, even to himself. The 
enhanced memory ability can be exploited so that an individual is never able to forget. 
Anti-aging medications are being developed in order to increase both lifespan and 
healthspan. Someone who engages in taking such a medication could easily be exploited for 
purposes of research in other capacities. For instance, it is not unreasonable that such a 
person could be taken against their will and experimented on for the gain of other 
countries who may not have developed such a technology. Stealing technology that comes 
in non-human form is far from unheard of. It is not far-fetched to think that some countries 
would do the same to technologically enhanced humans. Anyone with a radical 
enhancement can have various rights violated or their own enhanced ability used against 
them, just like anyone else. Particular enhancements do not necessarily come with a way to 
protect yourself from people who would take advantage of it. 
We already do not accept the ideas of transhumanists. Transhumanists make up a 
small percentage of enhancement supporters. Oftentimes, they are regarded as too radical 
for mainstream cultural norms. In this case, we can see the experience of marginalisation 
where radical futurists are shunned or mocked for their ideas and practices, especially 
within related fields. Marginalisation could be experienced more acutely by transhumanists 
than by more ordinary enhanced individuals if, once they have become transhuman, they 
have broken the species-typical aspect of being a human. We associate personhood with 
being human. If someone who has been consciously uploaded, or has indefinite life and 
health span, or has a body that is part cybernetic and part organic, they may no longer be 
considered human. In fact, their proposed nomenclature already separates transhumans 
and posthumans from humans. They may also not receive the same legal status as a human 
based on the fact they are distinctly no longer only human. Narratives have been 
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considered about the personhood of differently conscious sentient beings, mostly 
concerning highly functional animal species such as apes and chimpanzees. This 
unfortunately ventures into a long discussion of personhood that is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
The other point I wish to address was whether or not radically enhanced individuals 
could be disabled. In short, yes, they can be disabled. The way we designate people as 
disabled involves the interaction between both the medical and social models of disability. 
From the medical model, we see a deficit in ability on part of the individual that hinders 
everyday living as a disability. Also, Julian Savulescu claims that “certain biological or 
psychological states can be capabilities or disabilities depending on the social or natural 
environment” (2006, 333). An actual transhuman is likely to be subject to disability just as 
any being with ability can be susceptible to disability. While the transhumans currently do 
not exist, we can at least look at how this could happen based on the suggestions and 
models proposed by transhumanists for developing transhuman technology. Let’s look at 
the case of conscious uploading as an example. Consciousness needs a place to reside, likely 
in some mechanical or hybrid biomechanical structure. This structure may or may not 
mobile. If it is, this person (consciousness and mechanical structure) will have certain 
abilities. These could be strength, speed, ability to withstand extreme weather related 
events, but maybe not lightning. Lightning would certainly injure and disable this person. 
Most accounts I have read about transhumanism do not involve an option to return to the 
form of a human as we know them. Once you are transhuman, you cannot go back. You are 
now faced with a different set of needs than whatever was required by your previous 
embodiment. Anything that goes wrong with the transhuman form can be disabling 
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because you will not necessarily have the means to regain abilities that have been hindered 
that are critical for functioning. 
Transhumanists have the privilege of foresight to determine that they will need 
certain things and likely have the ability to prepare for living in such a form. So, while 
transhumanists may start with certain privileges that come with enhancement, they will 
still be subject to some forms of oppression that come with being perceived as abnormal. 
And, in fact, if they fail to foresee all possible future scenarios, there is a likeliness that the 
transhuman individual will become disabled or no longer exist altogether as the social and 
physical environment may lack appropriate features to afford their survival. A particular 
caveat to this is the idea that through radical enhancement, the transhumanist, upon 
transforming into this posthuman form, will develop or acquire some extremely enhanced 
sense of knowledge or wisdom that would equate to the psychic foresight necessary in 
order to eliminate this problem. I would concede to that, but also keep in mind that no one 
has any way of predicting future events to concretely claim that would or would not 
happen. 
The fact of transhumanism right now is that most of its goals are currently beyond 
our ability to achieve them. The only people with whom we can interact are not themselves 
enhanced. Despite their lack of radical enhancement, we call them transhumanists because 
they live the philosophy of transhumanism. In general, we relegate transhumanists to the 
fringes of the scientific world, saying that their ideas cannot possibly be real, that they are 
trying to be gods among humans, that they are seeking something completely unnatural 
and inhuman. What is often thought to be so wrong with transhumanism is not so much 
that superhumans could take over the world. Rather, it is the fear that humanity will no 
longer be necessary or we will be of a lesser moral personhood status. 
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Conclusion 
In summary, I would like to say that this paper addresses several key points that are 
overlooked by disability theorists and enhancement supporters. Rather than being in total 
opposition, disabled and enhanced individuals share the common feature of being viewed 
as abnormal. Enhancement technologies should continue to be developed with caution and 
good oversight. More to the point of this paper, I have tried to demonstrate the abnormality 
of both the disabled and the enhanced abled through the medicalisation and normalisation 
processes described by Michel Foucault, the normalising trends described by Mary Beth 
Mader, and the social interaction that leads to discrimination and oppression by 
Rosemarie-Garland Thomson and Iris Marion Young. While enhanced individuals may not 
face oppression to the degree that disabled persons do, they may face some significant 
hardships because of their enhancements. The status of being abnormal in the social 
context is precarious regardless of how it is manifested. The oppressive measures faced by 
abnormal individuals may be different, ranging from a lack of respect, to objectification, 
fetishization, commodification, and exploitation, to violence and eradication. By including 
enhancements in the topic of ability and disability, each part plays an informative role in 
how we perceive and analyse the others.  
The larger issue is how might we continue to work on the issues of social oppression 
in the face of developing technologies that can enrich and enhance our lives. We might do 
this by teaching values of acceptance of abnormal individuals rather than mere tolerance. 
Acceptance ranges from tolerance to beneficial cooperation. Mere tolerance is not enough 
to combat normalising oppression. However, it need not be the case that every person 
engages in a beneficial cooperation through friendships and close relationships either. Our 
cultural norms can be allowed to shift. The issue here is that there is still an intrinsic 
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hierarchy despite the broader categories of normal and abnormal. We still view abilities in 
the context of being able, not being able, or being incredibly able. The mode of 
enhancement that extends our already present abilities reinforces this categorisation. 
Transhumanist-type enhancement, on the other hand, reconceptualises the ability 
spectrum in a way that removes some abilities and grants others by seeking to change the 
embodiment of capability in such a way that it is distinctly something other than human 
whilst still resembling something descendent of human. The transhumanist ability 
becomes an extra-ability, or one that creates another axis of ability that disrupts the linear 
scale of our current understanding of abilities. We place a high value on those who can 
produce more as we have commodified individual ability. Perhaps if we viewed life as more 
of an overall experience rather than how much we can achieve or produce, we may shift 
towards a less stringent hierarchy of ability. 
One hope of enhancement supporters is that by increasing not only the incidence of 
encountering abnormal individuals, but also the variance of how abnormal individuals 
appear, abnormal appearances are more readily accepted in the social environment. A 
higher incidence of variance weakens what could be considered average or normal. It 
forces our expectations to change. If we continue to view disability as a deficit and 
enhancement as a benefit, then of course we will we look at this as if the norm is being 
moved farther and out of reach from those below the norm. However, if we view both as 
abnormal, where we aren’t viewing disability as a deficit and enhancement as a benefit, an 
increase in the visibility of one may benefit the other. As enhancers have the choice to 
enhance and to wear their enhancements visibly, they are in the better position to do this. 
Given that they have the choice, enhancers also have a certain privilege of being able to 
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return to normality if they so desire. Disabled individuals do not get this option - they must 
depend on society to change the view of what is normal. 
An objection to enhancement on the grounds that enhanced abilities are abnormal is 
that non-therapeutic (and many therapeutic) enhancements are a choice. Recalling the idea 
of morphological freedom, we must ask whether we are willingly entering into an 
oppressive state by making this choice. If we are aware of the risks, then this may be true. 
But in other cases of wilfully changing appearance to something socially considered 
abnormal, are the abnormal individuals asking for it? In everyday situations, people dye 
their hair unnatural colours knowing that they could potentially be a target of harassment 
and marginalisation. This does not have to happen, though. Making the claim that someone 
ought to forfeit their enhanced ability or not to enhance their ability at all violates their 
sense of autonomy. Many enhancements are temporary or reversible. One can certainly 
give up an enhancement to avoid oppression related to that particular ability. Exploitation 
entails a certain loss of autonomy. Giving up that ability to escape exploitation amounts to 
self-sabotage, even if it is an autonomous act. In exploitation, the person being exploited 
can take actions self-sabotage and no longer be useful to the person doing the exploiting. 
When the person no longer has that ability, she is now useless to the exploiter. Those who 
are exploited, if they ruin their reason for being exploited, may be subjected to punishment, 
violence, being thrown out, killed, or taken to be exploited in another way. Exploitation 
operates outside of fairness. A person who is exploited, who can no longer produce, is likely 
to suffer severe consequences. Giving up the enhancement while being oppressed violates a 
certain sense of autonomy.  
We may also be tempted to say that the person should have been aware of the 
potential for exploitation or violence. The foresight necessary to predict exploitation as it is 
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occurring in real time is not exactly a proper objection. For this, I invoke the idea of psychic 
foresight, a sort of foresight that entails an attitude of “you should have known better” 
when obviously no one can predict what might happen to them in the future. It is one thing 
to be aware of the risk of exploitation. It is quite another to see it before it happens to you. 
We are in an awkward place where we are trying to navigate a social terrain in which no 
one wants to be forced to change. Unfortunately, if one does not change, one may be left 
behind especially if the surrounding social environment is unresponsive to the needs of the 
individual. We do not operate in this world alone. Social responsibility must be taken up as 
well as individual responsibility. Yes, we may make alternative means for accessibility for a 
variety of types of ability, but the responsibility of increasing function and ability is on the 
shoulders of both the individual and society. We have a tendency to demand the individual 
be normal, for the disabled to rise up so we do not have to wait for them and for those who 
outperform to slow down so the rest of society can keep up. But we could change what the 
norm is to be more inclusive of the varieties.  
A significant objection from disability theorists is that more enhancement will raise 
the overall norm of ability. It is thought that enhancement will further exacerbate issues 
associated with disabled individuals. Disabled individuals are frequently viewed as 
incapable of working, incapable of making life choices, stupid, slow, unproductive, lazy, 
attention seeking, leaching, and unworthy of living. Many are blamed for their disabilities, 
especially when no accommodations are enacted. They are subjected to oppressive 
measures such as discrimination, harassment, marginalisation, violence, and 
powerlessness. In many cases, people with disabilities are subjected to eugenics protocols 
ranging from forced sterilisation to blatant extermination. The gaps associated with 
comparative differences in ability rest in how much we value that ability. If our value of a 
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particular ability is that it is expected, then yes, gaps will be created and exacerbated by 
increasing the number of people who have increased abilities. Raising the norm to an ever 
higher standard is likely unavoidable if we pursue enhancing only abilities that enjoy a high 
status in our society. If we focus our enhancement developments towards increasing 
variance of abilities, we will be forced to look at our environments in other creative ways. 
Increasing the variance of ability of people in the world weakens the power of what can be 
conceived of as normal. It forces our hand to create spaces that function for broader 
varieties of people. Taking an approach from non-therapeutic additive enhancements, we 
look at those who have the flexibility to not need suffer immediate consequences if their 
environment is lacking in affordances for them. They are still capable, but at the same time, 
it affords the opportunities for development without the tension of critical need even 
though those who need the change the most will ultimately benefit. We ought to be re-
evaluating our relationship to social norms while we are taking progressive steps in 
developing technology that can benefit all people. When we develop enhancement 
technologies, we should be looking at the broader impact they will have for the whole of 
society. Perhaps we ought to be looking at enhancements for our environment as well as 
for individuals. 
The transhumanist wants to shift the norm of being human to something that is 
posthuman, but still a person. This calls for a radical restructuring of how we see ourselves 
in relation to each other. One of the goals is to eradicate the incidence of disability. While 
such a goal is admirable in a sense, disability will always exist so long as ability exists if we 
continue to view ability as a dichotomy. Transhumanism may change the content of 
abilities for transhumans, but they will still be subject to disability themselves as all things 
are subject to imperfection and abnormality. So far, enhancement proponents (not 
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necessarily transhumanists), have been focusing on how to enhance the individual body. 
They could look beyond enhancing the individual and look more into how enhancements 
can be made to our social environments. Enhancements can be made to make our 
environments work for us rather than against us such as creating work spaces that 
encourage creativity and human connection, rather than isolated workspaces in a hive-like 
office space. Other enhancements in the social environment could include means of 
accessing knowledge that one ordinarily would not have but would not need any special 
device to obtain, such as the lighted traffic signs being implemented on roadways. The idea 
of providing accessible information could be spread to include digital signs with audible 
announcements at bus stops and metros. Some of these things already exist in the world, 
but ought to be extended to other areas where people frequently need information such as 
stores, parks, recreational facilities, and so forth. Innovation for these sorts of 
enhancements are boundless. This has the potential to change the content of our norm of 
individual ability into a collective ability where individuals relate to the structural 
environment more effectively regardless of their medical degree of ability. Norms shift and 
change over time. While technological progress is speeding up in a lot of ways, it is also 
showing signs of slowing. We have had a significant increase in innovation but we have not 
yet figured out all the permutations of applying those innovations. Creating newer and 
newer technology is not necessarily what shifts the norm. The shift occurs as the new 
technology spreads through the social fabric and becomes integrated into daily life. This is 
where we must pay close attention to how technology is dispersed throughout society. Is it 
sold? Is it designed for individual use? Is it designed for many people to use in a public 
space? The content of the norm is subject to change. Many of the newer technologies are 
being made with increased accessibility in mind. Making enhancements to raise disability 
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to a normal expected ability serves to reinforce the norm. Making enhancement available to 
those who have normal abilities serves to shift the norm. The way we look at 
enhancements of both therapeutic and nontherapeutic varieties right now is how they are 
applied to individuals. This creates an aggregate of enhanced individuals, some who are 
normalised, some who are expanding abnormal ability, and some who are both. We should 
also be considering how enhancements can be used in broader terms, such as enhancing an 
environment to meet the needs of the individuals engaged in that environment. We could 
look more into enhancements that can be applied to the social environment, where they 
could increase accessibility and functionality for a more varied group of individuals. As a 
biological species, we are constantly trying to find new ways to survive. As a social species, 
we will likely always have hierarchies. So long as we value sameness, a norm will always 
hold power. Enhancement can shift a norm, but it can also cause more abnormality if the 
enhancement is not extending already present abilities. As a social species, we are 
responsive to the needs of others. We do not develop a technology and purposefully keep it 
out of reach. It takes time, but if accommodations for accessibility are needed, they will be 
brought about. It would be wrong to categorically reject enhancement out of fear when so 
much benefit can be gained and so much change can be initiated in how we can come to 
accept naturally occurring variances and abnormalities brought about by any means. 
Looking through the lens of abnormality, we can take this instead as a further call in 
social change and development to embrace and accept that which is abnormal rather than 
constantly trying to fix or standardise it. It is possible that we could see a different effect in 
which a wider range of abilities are accommodated for in the social environment. It is likely 
that what is considered a normal ability will change given newer technologies. For 
example, we consider driving a car to be normal in our society. Of course everyone is not 
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able to drive. Many people do not have the financial resources, but others are not physically 
able of operating a motor vehicle. We have changed the norm of self-transport and mobility 
to be much faster and more efficient by using technological means. In doing so, we changed 
the world around us and now clear flat pathways are available for all means of transport. 
Did this impact the lives of disabled individuals in a particularly harmful way? That is 
difficult to say. Many disabled individuals make use of roads and vehicles just as people 
without disabilities do. Enhancement could change that, changing personal transport to 
one that is not based on the ground. Roads would become obsolete. But then it would the 
responsibility of an entire society to maintain the tools for all to flourish. As we develop 
technologies to enhance our lives, we change those technologies as we see fit so that they 
may be accessible to as many people as we wish. In this case of transportation, self-driving 
cars can be assistive to people who would not, under current conditions, ordinarily be able 
to drive. In enhancing the abilities of people, we have made it the norm to be immune from 
a number of devastating illnesses. By reducing the incidence of polio, did people who are 
paralysed experience more or less discrimination and oppression in their lives? That is an 
impossible question to answer. Abnormal people will always be striving for acceptance. 
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